When things fall apart
K. K. Katyal

The Idea of Pakistan
by Stephen Philip Cohen.
Oxford University Press. Pages 382. Rs 495.

Though next door, Pakistan has been a puzzle to average Indians, and even experts and policy-makers, at times, have not been able to explain the logic of what’s happening there. This is reflective of both the complexities of the situation in that country since its inception 58 years ago and inexplicable indifference of experts in India to conduct an in-depth study of the internal dynamics of Pakistan. With The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen Philip Cohen, a former Professor at the University of Illinois, a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and now a Senior Fellow of a prestigious US think-tank, Brookings Institution, fills the gap.

Yes, Cohen’s primary focus is on the "idea" of Pakistan, but he dwells at greater length on how it was transformed into a "state", and how it got distorted and perverted in the process. His is a comprehensive account of the manner the earlier assumptions went awry. The "idea" becomes a reference point for the argument to prove that it changed beyond recognition in the course of its conversion into a "state".

Cohen addresses several key questions, providing credible explanations in most cases. Where that is not possible, he confines himself to likely case scenarios. One would have liked a fuller answer to the most-asked question: why did the generals in Pakistan conduct themselves differently from their counterparts in India, even though they belonged the to the same British-military-training-school stock?

He ascribes it to the failure of the leadership to establish a functioning constitution or hold regular and consequential elections and concludes: "In this constitutionally uncertain environment, Pakistan did not take long to move in an authoritarian direction." He refers to the meagre support for a separate Muslim state in the areas constituting Pakistan and the weakness of the political institutions there.

An elaboration of these points would have been of greater use. Similarly, there was enough historical record (the British Government’s documents have now been de-classified) in support of the Indian view, that Partition, in part, was the product of the British imperial strategy. This called for more than a passing reference.

However, many other substantial questions have been dealt with comprehensively. Why did Pakistan not stick to the secular vision of its architect, Mohammed Ali Jinnah? Is Pakistan going to end as a failed state? Will the Pakistan army succumb to the influence of Islamic fundamentalists? What will be the course of Pakistan’s relations with India and the US?

The answers have been woven in the marathon narrative, product of painstaking research. Episodal and reflective, Cohen is a chronicler, a political scientist and an analyst in equal measures. The chronicler in him begins with the beginning: the mooting of the idea of a separate Muslim state by the great Urdu philosopher-poet, Mohammed Iqbal. Ironically one of his earlier poems, Saare Jahan Se Achha Hindustan Hamara, has virtually the status of a national anthem for military bands.

This was before he was influenced by the Pan-Islamic philosophy, as evident from the subsequent, amended verse: Muslim Hain Ham, Vatan Hai Sara Jahan Hamara (we are Muslims and the entire world is our abode). That was in 1930, and three years later, a group of Indian students at Cambridge proposed the name Pakistan. Another irony is that the Arya Samaji Urdu Press of Lahore was instrumental in making the name widely known.

There is incontrovertible evidence of Jinnah’s vision of a democratic Pakistan that would be tolerant of religious minorities, socially progressive and constitutionally modern in the western sense. As noted by Cohen, Jinnah left no document outlining his plans for a new state, but gave several addresses that constitute benchmarks in the history of both "state" and "idea" of Pakistan. Like his exhortation to the new Pakistanis: "Forget the past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what is his colour, caster or creed is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations".

What went wrong then? Cohen has this explanation: "Despite their import, Jinnah’s fine words had little impact: these were delivered just as a historically unprecedented 6-8 million refugees poured into Pakistan. Jinnah had sought and welcomed trained Indian Muslims, but had not reckoned on a mass migration of the dispossessed, the fearful, and the deprived, many of whom fled to Pakistan not out of idealism, but out of terror. A few speeches could not erase four decades of emphasis on the differences between Hindus and Muslims, and the threat to Muslims from the larger community."

Brief comments by Jinnah during his encounters with the Press in the run-up to Partition, recalled by the vanishing old breed of mediapersons (not mentioned by Cohen), are of considerable interest. Just as he was about to leave for Karachi to take over the office of Governor General of the new dominion, Jinnah was asked whether his government would be theocratic or secular? "What is a theocratic government?" he interrupted. "The one which is led by the mullahs," the scribes explained. "What about a government headed by a pandit?" Jinnah snapped.

The army–politician relationship is brought out vividly in these words: "One military intervention in fifty years could be seen as an incident and two as an aberration, but four spells of military rule indicate deeper systemic problems. The army’s relationship with the political process can be characterised as a five-step dance. First, the army warns what it regards as incompetent or foolish civilians. Second, a crisis leads to army intervention, which is followed by the third step: attempts to ‘straighten out’ Pakistan, often by introducing major constitutional changes. Fourth, the army, faced with growing civilian discontent, ‘allows’ civilians back into office, and fifth, the army reasserts itself behind a façade of civilian government, and the cycle repeats itself."

The author rules out failure of Pakistan as a state, but feels that it will be lodged between a weak democracy and a benevolent autocracy.

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