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The canons of warfare Indian Army Doctrine
Doctrine as a concept is not widely understood. Many have confused it, wrongly, with military operations and plans. A doctrine gives guidelines for the synergistic employment of all components of the Army in different situations, derived from a variety of sources: strategy; history; technology; nature of threats; inter-services relationship; and political decisions. The doctrine is not intended to give you final answers, but only directional principles and military thoughts. Many have questioned the need for a doctrine and hinted that security is being jeopardised. Many say it will bring in a rigid approach. How did the Army function for so long without it? True, the Indian Army did not have a written doctrine for nearly five decades, but the need for it was always felt. The entire Army needed to function in unison to ensure that the doctrine was within one’s capability and met the nation’s goals and objectives. In 1998, the Army Training Command (ARTRAC), then under my command, published a formalised, unclassified doctrine. The present document is a much-needed revision. The first of the 21 chapters covers definitions, the security environment and facts regarding the Army. The definition of doctrine, clear and comprehensive, is as follows: "A formal expression of military knowledge and thought that an army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success." The second chapter deals with the spectrum of conflict, the types of wars as well as the perennial "principles of war". Besides the ten traditional principles, one more has been added — intelligence — although I would have opted for "information" instead. Current and future operations are dealt in sufficient detail in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Besides covering war, winning factors and levels of war, topics like application of combat power, command, control and leadership have also been included. Stress has been laid on surprise and deception, technology and revolution in military affairs (RMA). Situational awareness, directive command and enhanced mobility have been emphasised. The new concept of warfare (NCW), which makes extensive use of technology, information warfare and electronic systems, has been highlighted. Investment in information structures is imperative, as is the need to develop systems jointly for seamless operations. It might be wrong, however, to say that the impact of RMA in a low-intensity conflict might not be much. An entire section has been devoted to special forces operations, but the focus is on operations in conjunction with the field force. Independent, unobtrusive, covert and other similar roles are missing. Joint operations and its principles have been described in detail. However, ambiguity about the joint command continues. While the concept of an "overall force commander" has been mentioned, the present concept of "coordination" continues to be advocated. The common ground between the services has still not been found. While the higher direction of military operations finds mention, the overall unity of command is largely glossed over. The "hearts and minds" approach is covered in detail, as is the "code of conduct" for troops, information management, human rights and stress in small team operations. The last two sections deal with non-combat operations, like aid to civil authority, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and UN peacekeeping missions. However, "coalition missions", that may well come our way in future, have not been mentioned. The penultimate chapter deals with different aspects of logistics. The last chapter is Preparing for War, where a section each is devoted to force structuring, training and professional and military ethos. Nuclear forces find no mention. The last section, Professionalism and Military Ethos, touches upon the nuances of the profession of arms, the military code, the strength of the regimental system and the moral contract between the soldier and society. The revised Indian Army Doctrine is timely and covers the essentials competently. The doctrine espouses current operations, current thinking, and current concepts, and hence it is a doctrine for today. Future threats are not for us to see, although it may help. The author, a former Vice-Chief of
the Army Staff, now heads the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. |
The
book is a two-part document; the main part is unclassified and in the
public domain, while the second is the classified adjunct, for
restricted circulation. This review is only of the unclassified portion.