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War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers.
Yet, in the aftermath of the tsunami, Anton Balasingham’s book pales somewhat in its significance; if only because the national, regional and international priority is to help Sri Lanka’s recovery from the devastation. Inevitably, it minimises the urgency of what is, without doubt, a compelling volume that is authoritative despite being one-sided. The book came out sometime in November 2004 and selective release of excerpts had stirred much interest, which dissolved when the tidal waves hit the island republic. Anton Balasingham is the best-known and most acceptable international face of the LTTE. As a theoretician, he is to Sri Lankan Tamils what Suslov was to the Soviet Communists, although the LTTE has been more Pol Potist than Stalinist in its political ways. He is the political advisor to the LTTE and its supremo V Pirabakaran and was instrumental in opening the way to the Norway-facilitated peace talks between the Tamil Tigers and the Government of Sri Lanka. He was the LTTE’s chief negotiator at the talks with Colombo, which were suspended after six rounds of talks in April 2003. The LTTE’s Political Head S P Thamilchelvan replaced Balasingham as chief negotiator, but the former had no occasion for such a role as the talks were suspended. As a result Balasingham continues to enjoy much higher visibility than any other LTTE functionary. Balasingham sets out the origins of the armed struggle and the role of the LTTE at various stages of its armed struggle, including during the period of Indian involvement in the mid-1980s. He recounts the various peace efforts in which the LTTE took part from the talks in Thimpu to the Norwegian-assisted process that, admittedly, has "melted at the edges". The analysis is rigorous, and the insights, though unabashedly partisan, are useful for the interpretations they can be subjected to. For all its one-sidedness, the book is a valuable resource. Yet, the book’s chief ‘merit’ is its one-sidedness, and arising from that, its importance as a mission statement of the LTTE, especially in the context of the struggle being frozen in a twilight zone that is neither war nor peace. The book admirably serves Balasingham’s purpose of "clarifying" the LTTE’s position on the "Oslo Declaration" which records their agreeing to a federal solution. The declaration, at the conclusion of the third round of talks in Oslo in December 2002, said that "the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka". This was projected as a breakthrough and was expected to add to the momentum of negotiations when other developments and issues – including the LTTE’s demand for Interim Self-Governing Authority – exploded on the agenda. Almost two years after that – during which period negotiations have broken down and political changes in Sri Lanka have increased the uncertainty over resumption of talks — Balasingham tells us that there was no such thing as an "Oslo Declaration". In fact, he asserts that if the demand for regional self-rule is rejected, then the LTTE would have no alternative but to secede and form an independent state. Whether this extreme position has been revived with a view to compel Colombo to return to the negotiating table on the LTTE’s terms, or to justify their rejection of negotiations, will remain a conjecture till the Tamil Tigers make their next big move. What the book clarifies is that unless the LTTE wins de facto recognition of its de jure political and military authority in some form, it may not be prepared to proceed further with the negotiations. Whether Balasingham has come forth with the clarification and elaborated on it because the LTTE has shifted ground to redefine the talking terms is immaterial. The reality is that the LTTE has now taken this position and Balasingham is articulating and rationalising it. However, for now, this is not the uppermost concern in the island. When Sri Lanka comes to grips with the after-effects of the tsunami and life returns to the familiar routines of the last 20 years, the ethnic conflict will be back to the political centre-stage. That would be the time to revisit Balasingham’s book for a closer look at the subtext for decoding the LTTE’s signals. |
The
tsunami that struck Sri Lanka, far from washing away the battle lines in
the war-torn nation, has actually sharpened antagonism between the
Sinhala majority and the separatist Tamil guerrillas in the North East.
Immediately after the embattled island was battered by the terrible
tides of December 26, there was a glimmer of hope: that nature’s fury
would bond the two communities and their political leadership to get on
with life more harmoniously. Unfortunately, that has not happened. On
the contrary, the political one-upmanship between the mainstream
parties, and between them and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
betray a hardening of positions.