|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A Clash of Political Cultures: Sino-Indian Relations (1957-62)
With a brief outline of the background and a briefer still summing up , the study is divided into a dozen or so short, crisp chapters. Starting with the ‘revolt in Tibet’ (March 1959), which was a preview of the sharp decline in the relationship between the two countries, the book reviews such familiar terrain as treatment of Indians in Tibet, border incidents, the prime ministers’ correspondence and a miasma of mistrust leading to the war itself. Much of the ground covered is old, hackneyed stuff. The only redeeming feature is that in the narration the author makes some interesting observations. For instance, the jack that in the beginning the war was restricted to the eastern and western sectors only, neither the middle nor yet the Sikkim sector saw any fighting. Also, the fighting was confined to the ground forces, the Air Force provided transport and supply services only. Moreover, the hostilities lasted no more than a week in each of the two phases over a period of one month. At the end of it all, while the Chinese achieved the military objective they had in view; their political objective "receded further in time." Bhutani also talks about the poignancy in Nehru’s words and his deep chagrin at the behaviour of the Chinese. The hopes and aspirations for peaceful and friendly relations" which he had entertained, he wrote to his Chinese counterpart on the morrow of the war, had been shattered by Beijing’s behaviour. More, he stood aghast at China’s "deliberate, cold-blooded" decision to enforce their "alleged" boundary claims by "an armed invasion" of India. The principal merit of the book — that it re-lives the old days — also weighs heavily against it. There is little or no evidence that its author has cared to study, much less reflect on, all that has been written on the subject in a little over four decades since the Chinese assault. His solitary sketch map is a reproduction of a 1962 official publication. Apart from a whole range of studies which came this reviewer’s way two which have recently been noticed in these columns-Jhon Garver’s Protracted Contest and Francine Frankel’s The India-China Relationship-are deserving of close scrutiny. They underline the rationale behind Chinese actions and the way things were viewed in Beijing. Here it may help to reflect on a Harvard-based Chinese philosopher’s observation that all Chinese rulers had an "overpowering obligation" to preserve the unity of their civilisation and could make "no compromise" in their cultural attitudes about "power and authority." The war, edgar Snow wrote on the morrow of Mao’s victory, proved "much more costly"to Beijing than to New Delhi. The real gainer in the conflict, the author suggests, was Tibetan Buddhism, which has now gained a global following. Another sobering reflection is a forceful reminder of Nehru’s personal tragedy. For while his domestic critics confined his negotiating space, his power-conscious interlocutors in Beijing were ruthless in their public vilification of the man who genuinely desired and earnestly hoped for a peaceful settlement of differences. repeated assurances about "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation" as the touchstone of a fair settlement were, when it came to the prass packs, an exercise in futility, and self deception. Bhutani was a member of
the Indian Foreign Service who had a brief stint in Beijing apart from a
number of other capital, including Jakarta, Cairo and Canberra. |
In
the light of the fourth round of New Delhi-Beijing talks in November
this year, in the Chinese capital which, hopefully, will help sort out
the long-simmering border dispute, the book helps to put things in
sharper focus. It goes over the oft-repeated tale of how relations
between the two neighbours deteriorated over the five-year period that
led to the clash of October 1962.