Sunday, November 9, 2003


The illusion of coherence
Shelley Walia

The Roots of Romanticism
by Isaiah Berlin.
Chatto and Windus, London. £ 20. Pages 171.

 

Isaiah Berlin
Isaiah Berlin

BENEATH the surfaces of these lectures on Romanticism, one can hear Isaiah Berlin’s imagination girding itself for the numerous books to follow. His attention to Romanticism was not merely historical, for he saw this vital movement as having a tough impact on great many phenomena of the present day — nationalism, existentialism, democracy, totalitarianism. In it he saw the final fall of the Platonic and the Aristotelian tradition of the possibility of finding ideal answers to all legitimate questions, that all answers are within the capacity of our perception and our logic.

If these answers are attuned with one another, a universal attempt for knowledge and inquiry about human concerns and problems such as racism, environment or political crime all becomes central to the history of human thought that enables man to prevail over all problems on this planet. The rise of totalitarianism, of Hitler or Stalin is the result of assertion of one’s will over the rest of humanity, an affirmation of the Platonic school of thought.

German Romanticism in the 17th and 18th century, once and for all dismantled this notion of absolute fixity of human endeavour for knowledge, thereby transforming western consciousness. In this world of constant change, a man "with a powerful will can mould, if only temporarily, anything he pleases," as Berlin puts it. Aspirations or goodness was relative; what one nation dreamt of could be different from what another nation thought. Absolutes were thrown to the wind.


As Berlin maintains, human life is always in a process of "perpetual forward creation" and "all schemes, all generalisations, all patterns imposed upon it are forms of distortion". The exponents of grand-narratives of science or of systems do not realise that logic and classification, in fact, deaden the living life and imaginative intuition of man. Berlin, early in his life, began to contrast the intuitive and the imaginative perceptions of reality with the lifeless material of the rationalists.

Although we would normally think of the acquisition of knowledge in terms of a rational process, the intrinsic essence of a person, or of something which is observed, involves non-rational states, and in so far as they involve knowledge, the process is a subjective source of truth. This can be explained through Stephen Dedalus’s idea of claritas which he dwells upon in his aesthetic theory set out in James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as Young Man.

Stephen defines it first as the relationship between, on one hand, the observer’s intellect and imagination, and the external physical stimuli on the other. However, it becomes awkward for him to rationalise this phenomenon of revelation of truth owing to its illusive nature which defies any type of formulaic approach. The evanescence of reality necessarily eludes definition or capture. Nothing remains static.

In this context, Berlin does not accept the vulgar Marxist notion that economic relations alone determine the way a society evolves. Berlin finds the relative nature of the human mind being overlooked in this rather reductionist approach. Though consciousness is socially produced, it varies owing to the experience and personality of the individual, who is always in the process of interpreting knowledge.

Inherent in society are problems concerning areas of knowing, perceiving, feeling, guessing, being mistaken, inferring, reflecting and so on. This epistemological process of quest for knowledge by active human beings results in a distinctive experience of time, space and causality that is transitory, fortuitous and arbitrary. On the other hand, a philosopher like Condorcet, who has faith in human intelligence and universal reason and believes that "a good law must be good for everyone", is according to Habermas, possessed "of the extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences would promote not only the control of natural forces, but also understanding of the world and the self, moral progress, the justice of institutions and even the happiness of human beings".

Berlin had already written about this debate in his lecture titled ‘The Romantic movement: A Crisis in the History of Modern Thought’. Here as well as in the rest of the lectures, he is mainly concerned with reassessing the philosophers of the past for the only reason that he found no distinction between his intellectual concerns and the public sphere. The Russian revolution of 1917, the two wars, along with the interest that he had in Marxist thinking and the Middle East upheaval in the creation of Israel all led to his deep antipathy towards violence as means of attaining political ends.

The morality of motives became as important to him as the probity of consequences. Are human beings not responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions? This was no doubt a platitude of ethical thought. It was hardly an ideology, but it unquestionably formed the centre of his world view.

Romanticism at long last ushered in the strong and human values of commitment, sincerity and good faith all moving towards the idea of a moral individual, who at least seeks to minimise the harm caused by his action or inaction. These lectures on Romanticism exemplify the need for the understanding and tolerance in the face of plurality of human needs and aspirations, and the inherent incompatibility of human ideals.

Berlin never wanted to have these lectures published, but Henry Hardy has gone to great lengths to edit his lectures and see to it that these are correctly footnoted; Berlin was in the habit, like many of us, of spontaneously telling us in his own words what the great thinkers had said, and sometimes even improvising what the author had said. Thus, there was an imperative need to edit his lectures. These were broadcast on the BBC network, but the speed of his delivery left many of his keen readers desiring the publication of some of the most intensely and insightful views on a very relevant movement.

Berlin was indeed essential to our times as a secular opponent of enlightenment which labels him as an active supporter of polemical European anti-rationalist tradition and existentialism. The grip of forms evaded him like it evades life. His doggedness held together all his fox-like chase in the defence of the all-encompassing plurality of theorist and tyrannous ideologies that maintain the non-contradictory nature of all ends.

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