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The introductory chapter sets the
tone and goes back to the 18th century, if not a little earlier,
when Russia’s bonds with the "Land of Joo (the
Buddha)," as Tibet was known, were established through its
own Trans-Baikal Buddhist communities, the Buryats and the
Kalmyks. Towards the closing decade of the century, however,
Tibet decided to shut its doors, especially in the wake of the
Gurkha war (1791-2). And when some chinks appeared almost a 100
years later, there had been a sea change in the Central Asian
landscape. For while the Ch’ing control tightened, the British
in India were steadily feeling their way across the Himalayas.
Their "sinister" designs, all too evident in the
conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Sikkim (1890) and
the then seemingly impending establishment of a British
protectorate over Tibet. While it unnerved the lamas no end, the
Russians too felt far from comfortable with powerful factions at
the Tsar’s court determined to establish their influence
"over all of Inner Asia right through to the
Himalayas".
The British
response was the Younghusband expedition (1904), its raison d’etre
Curzon’s seeming helplessness to thwart the activities of the
Russian Buryat Agvan Dorjief, who had the ear of the Tsar, and
at the same time had inched his way into the inner counsels of
the young, and ambitious, 13th Dalai Lama. Since the latter
proved singularly unresponsive to British overtures, it was
decided to dispatch an armed expedition to Lhasa. Meanwhile,
thanks to its stunning defeat at the hands of Japan (1904-5) and
growing restlessness at home, the Tsarist government washed its
hands of Tibet and its ruler. The end result was the
Anglo-Russian convention (1907) which brought the crucial half a
century and more of the Great Game to a halt.
Tsarist Russia’s
subsequent debacle in the war against Germany and the October
(1917) Revolution do not concern us except for the fact that the
Soviets, who now enter the scene, were not averse to
reestablishing their country’s earlier ties with the master of
the Potala. The first head of the Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs, the staunch Marxist and Anglophobe Georgyi Chicherin,
was deeply involved in the exercise for "a small secret
reconnaissance expedition" to Tibet, which after a great
deal of behind-the-scene messaging arrived in the Tibetan
capital in April 1922 for a three-week sojourn. Two full-scale
missions, those of Sergei Borisov and Klamyk Chapehaev,
followed. And then, a US-funded, Soviet-backed
"mysterious" expedition led by the eminent Russian
emigre painter Nikolai Roerich, which was to prove singularly
abortive.
The conclusions
are along predictable lines. Both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes
sought friendly relations with Tibet and its Dalai Lama and
tried to "use" the traditional Russian Buddhist
connection with Lhasa for their political ends. While the
Tsarist regime was both "vacillating and wary," the
Soviets were more "active, purposeful and coherent".
Andreyev’s
massive work is a delight to behold; his meticulous, detailed
research may well be the envy of the most sophisticated scholar.
Not only has he used hitherto inaccessible Soviet sources, but
also juxtaposed these with contemporary archives in the PRO in
London. His dogged persistence in knocking on tightly shut doors
until they yielded ground to his patience and skill, is worth
emulating.
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