Sunday, September 7, 2003		Books

Off the shelf
The rise and fall of Ayub Khan
V. N. Datta

LEOPOLD van Ranke, who laid the foundation of German historiography in the 19th century, had recognised the importance of primary source material in the reconstruction of the foreign policy of a country. He greatly valued the reports of the diplomats for the internal history of the countries in which these personages resided. By using the dispatches of Prussian ambassadors in England, he produced an illuminating story of the domestic situation during the Stuarts reign. Following the Rankean tradition of looking at the diplomatic and domestic situation from the other side of the coin, Roedad Khan has compiled and edited a volume entitled The British Papers: Secret and Confidential, India Pakistan, Bangladesh Documents 1958-1 969, with an introduction by Humayun Khan. (Oxford University Press. Pages XXII+ 989).

A distinguished civil servant, the editor, Roedad Khan, held key positions in the Pakistan Government. He was the Chief Secretary and Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior, and also adviser to four Presidents. Humayun Khan, a Trinity scholar of Cambridge, had retired as Foreign Secretary, Pakistan (1988 -89), and acted later as Director of the Commonwealth Foundation in England ( 1993).

Drawing his material largely form the British archives, particularly from the Public Relations Office, Kew, Richmond in England, Roedad has literally followed the model set by The American Papers: Secret and Confidential, Pakistan and Bangladesh (1965-73). The volume under review deals with the rise and fall of Field Marshal Ayub Khan during the period from 1958 to 1969. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Ayub had illegally usurped power which he was to hand over later to another Commander-in-Chief General Agha Mohamed Yahya Khan.

In his illuminating introduction, Humayun Khan has specified some of the key domestic and foreign policy issues such as the assumption of power by Iskander Mirza and Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the ousting of the former and the military rule imposed by the latter, the Indo -Pak relations, including the Indo-Pak war.

In his introduction, Humayun Khan emphasises that the civil and military rulers of Pakistan had failed miserably to build up their country and squandered the nation’s resources due to their vaulting ambitions and short-sightedness. According to him, the rulers misused power blatantly and completely neglected the well-being of the people of the country who, he thought, were made of sound human material capable of playing a vital role in the destiny of Pakistan.

Quite a number of documents throw valuable light on the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965. The British perception, being quite clear-cut, held Pakistan primarily responsible for the war. According to the British, the Indians escalated the conflict but the initial mischief lay in Pakistan operation ‘Gibralter.’ The documents show that Ayub Khan realised his mistake later for having put the entire country to risk. Ayub proved too confident to be prudent. Like us in India, Pakistan never cared to learn any lesson from the mistakes committed by her.

These documents show how some of the leading Pakistan leaders and officials shared secretly the important state matters with British diplomats. This is reflected in these documents a profound British analysis of the growth of nationalist upsurge and an anti-state feeling showing clear signs of the coming storm in the province which led to its complete separation for the federal Pakistan. The British diplomatists feared that Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman’s alienation was bound to create a serious political situation in East Bengal. There is, however, not much material in the documents on the Sino-Indian relations.

The Document 9.105, a report pertaining to Major General J.D. Lunt, Deputy Adviser to the High Commission, Pakistan, provides a brilliant analysis of the psychology of the Indian Army, particularly its attitude towards Pakistan. The Indian Army is shown strongly resenting Nehru’s obsessions with non-alignment, his prevarications and incompetence in dealing with foreign and defence policy matters. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, is viewed as a liability on the defence forces for his mercurial temper, abrasive manners and intriguing dispositions. There is also a clear anti-British feeling simmering in the Indian Army. But nowhere there is support on the Indian stand on Kashmir. On the contrary, there is much criticism.

The documents by C.S. Pickard unfolds the domestic situation in Pakistan—corruption is rife among the top-ranking politicians and military officers, and even Ayub’s own family is not free from this vice. On the whole, the mental outlook of the politicians is feudal and conservative, and bitterly hostile to any radical social and economic reform. Economic power is concentrated in few hands, and there prevails in the country appalling poverty. Hardly any sign of the amelioration of the people exists.

The British reports are highly critical of Ayub Khan’s administration, which is purely a police state that has muzzled brutally the freedom of expression. The situation was frightful — even dancing and music were forbidden in girls’ schools.

Ayub Khan concentrated the entire power in his own hand and brooked no criticism whatever from any quarter. This led to his complete isolation. The intelligentsia torn by tension and gnawed by fear was just an idle spectator to the grim and sordid situation prevailing in the country. Fearing the possibility of a coup, some of the British diplomatists foresaw that with the removal of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan or Air Marshal Nur Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Air force, would seize power and rule the country. For their own interest, the British wanted Ayub Khan to tide over the crises and stay in power.

Kashmir figures prominently in the documents, which provides an inside information on the Bhutto-Swarn Singh talks ending in utter failure. According to the British view, Pakistan’s strategy lay in enlisting a wide support on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council and the United Nations. The British understanding was that both India and Pakistan were rigidly sticking to their own point of view without any desire to break the deadlock. Summing up the imbroglio, the British held the view that "the Indians meant simply there would have to be signs of progress before India could discuss Kashmir and Pakistan might have taken this to mean that India would have to prepare their own public opinion, before announcing their concessions."

Finding the situation in Pakistan getting out of control, Ayub Khan resigned allowing General Yahya to justify his regime as a new one untainted by the old. The key passage in Ayub Khan’s farewell speech was: "I have always told you that Pakistan’s solution lay in a strong centre—but now it is being said that the country be divided into two parts. The centre should be rendered ineffective and powerless institution. The defence services should be crippled and the political entity be done away with. It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction of our country."

Ayub Khan admitted his own failure. He bowed out, making way for another military dictator in Pakistan, who brought disaster due to his self-righteousness, presumption and ineptitude.

This volume provides a first-class source material of great value on the domestic and foreign situation during the Ayub Khan regime to the researcher and the intelligentsia.