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The British policy makers had clearly come to the conclusion
that West Pakistan would best serve their future strategic
interests in the Middle East and Asia. An essential part of
these geo-strategic interests in the region was to gain an
assured access for Pakistan to Jammu and Kashmir, which was
feasible only if it came under undisputed control of Pakistan.
That is why Mountbatten wanted Jammu and Kashmir to accede to
Pakistan, but the Maharaja of the state acceded to India when
the Pakistani raiders had actually captured Baramula. According
to the author, "detailed examination of the role played by
the British would leave little doubt that they created the
Kashmir dispute."
He further states
that the British Government and the British officers retained in
India and Pakistan had played a significant role to restrain
India from any decisive military action, and to help Pakistan
retain its illegal territorial gains. He proves his point by
quoting the relevant actions of Mountbatten and the British
Commander-in-Chief in India during the actual operations in the
1947-48 war. It is the contention of the author after studying
the declassified records in the UK that the leakage of Indian
state secrets to London and details of anti-state actions taken
by the British participants were nothing short of acts of
betrayal. However, the author should have preferably given
references at the end of various chapters rather than mentioning
names of the books at the end.
Field Marshal Sam
Manekshaw, MC, who has written the foreword states, "Not
only does the book clearly and truthfully portray the fighting,
but also the machinations of the British Commanders-in-Chief of
both India and Pakistan, prior to and during the whole period of
the conflict. At no time did either Commander-in-Chief not know
the plan and action of the contestants; they were in constant
and continuous touch with other on the telephone. It would be
unbelievable to think that General Gracey, the British
Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, was not aware that Pathan
tribesmen had been sent into the Kashmir valley prior to the
accession of the state to India; in fact it would be correct to
state that the tribesmen were sent at his suggestion and
concurrence." And the Field Marshal should know, for he was
at that time serving as a senior officer in the Military
Operations Directorate at Army Headquarters, New Delhi, under
General Sir Roy
Bucher,
Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army. The directorate deals with the
operations in which the Indian Army takes part.
The book describes
the war in a thoughtful manner starting from the tribal invasion
on October 22, 1947, to the ceasefire on December 31, 1948,
which was at Pakistan’s request, as the Indian Army was on the
winning spree. This well-researched book should be a good
addition to any library.
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THE
book under review deals with the 1947-48 Indo-Pak war covering both
the military and political aspects. The author has consulted books
and documents, made available recently, to produce a logical account
of the first war fought by India after Independence. The
after-effects of this war continue to pose serious security problems
for India in Jammu and Kashmir, even though we have fought two more
wars, in 1965 and 1971, with Pakistan. The book brings out clearly
the intrigues of the senior British officers serving in India and
Pakistan during 1947-48 who combined to ensure that India could not
expel the Pakistan forces from Jammu and Kashmir, which had occupied
one-third of the state. "In the final analysis, it was unequal
equation between a naive and inexperienced Indian leadership and the
wily British who know what their national objectives were,"
remarks the author.
