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The evolution of the Indian Navy after Independence can be
examined under four phases. The first phase (1947-1965),
characterised by reliance upon British, was followed by the
phase of transition from the British dependence to the exercise
of Soviet option without really abandoning the British linkage.
The third phase was impacted by the end of the Cold War and the
dismemberment of the Soviet Union, whereas the last and the
current phase is marked by a search for more autonomous policy
in an international environment dominated by the industrialised
North and a steep rise in regional tensions, especially in the
context of Pakistan—and more recently the crises in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Whereas there is little doubt that India’s
naval capability has steadily grown both in qualitative and
quantitative terms.
A survey of
Pakistan’s navy reveals, especially in the context of its ‘sea
denial strategy,’ that unless Pakistan starts rebuilding its
navy now, it is likely to face ‘block obsolescence’ in the
times to come. The new naval base named after Jinnah, about 240
km west of Karachi, which is close to India’s maritime border
as well as air space, is expected to provide a defence in depth
to the navy from both naval as well as air attacks from India.
Notwithstanding various constraints, Pakistan has not only
continued to induce modern weapons like the modified Agosta-class
submarines, but it has also initiated a modest shipbuilding
project.
While commenting
on Bangladesh, the author says each country tends to define its
maritime strategy keeping in view its specific geo-strategic
requirements, its geopolitical location and the resources. The
maritime strategy of Bangladesh is aimed at the protection of
national sovereignty, territorial integrity; maritime and
riverine trade as well resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and the continental shelf. As the pace of maritime
regional cooperation in the Bay of Bengal has gathered momentum
since the 1990s, the threat perception vis-`E0-vis India appears
to have subsided. Whereas the growing naval power of Myanmar,
with which Bangladesh has an unresolved maritime boundary
dispute, is likely to be the focus of maritime threat perception
of Bangladesh in the years ahead.
Both Sri Lanka and
Maldives appear to be unaffected by the changes in the global
geopolitical environment. The threat perception of Maldives is
typical of a micro mid-ocean island republic comprising widely
separated islands. Besides the difficult task of patrolling its
vast EEZ with the help of a Coast Guard (Maldives does not
possess a navy), it continues to face the threat of a low
intensity conflict. While Sri Lanka’s maritime strategy
remains confined to the task of neutralising the threat of the
maritime low-intensity conflict being waged for over two decades
against the LTTE.
The book concludes
by pointing out that even though most of the South Asian states
are too small to evolve an effective autonomous maritime
capability, the regional maritime cooperation can overcome some
of the constraints. The concluding sentence of the book
succinctly sums up the imperative for the regional and
sub-regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region and sets the
tone and tenor for India’s ocean policy for the 21st century:
"A divided South Asia will be a pawn in the hands of
extra-regional powers. On the other hand, a unified South Asia
will be a major actor in the Indian Ocean region."
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