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Punjab had posed a challenge to the established forms and norms
of governance, policing and politics. Did the ‘state’ stand
up to act as per the wishes of the people or did it fail them?
As Walter Laqueur says in his book, The Age of Terrorism,
"Isn’t ‘state terrorism’ concomitant of
terrorism?" The latest to join the unending slanted debate
on the ‘Punjab problem’ is a bureaucrat, Sarab Jit Singh,
who was the Amritsar Deputy Commissioner from 1987 to 1992. He
has penned down his experiences and emotions in 339 pages (the
remaining 17 form the glossary and index) divided in 30
chapters.
His
"eyewitness" account transcends the boundaries of the
revenue district because 70 per cent of the state’s killings
took place in Amritsar, which also happened to be the
centre-stage of most of the "action". But the script
of all actions was written in New Delhi by cunning politicians,
who dipped their pen in vitriol to scar the body politic in
Punjab, which eventually ended up consuming over 21,000 lives
(figures may vary from one account to another). It is not the
cold statistics that send the chill down the spine but the
political machinations of the powers that masterminded such a
movement to settle political scores, cling to power or to
belittle the opponents to settle old scores. It is this very
aspect of the blood curdling drama/action that Sarab Jit Singh
has tried to guardedly unveil. Of course, one does come across a
discernible streak of bold writing and sees him point a finger
at those he perceives to be the ‘villain’ of the piece.
The book, in first
person, leaves a distinct "I" impression on the reader
when the author describes events and some behind-the-scene
deliberations, debates and discussions to which he was party. He
could have done a much better job if while giving his
"eyewitness" version he had stuck to the
"storytelling" style instead of covering the entire
period of militancy that he "saw" from Amritsar.
The book,
undoubtedly, has ruffled many a feather since it has brought to
focus several "facts": "terrorism in Punjab had
been planted but, despite all the care and nourishment, the soil
had not accepted it". He squarely blames the Congress for
the "mischief" in Punjab. Time and again he points at
Congress leaders from Indira Gandhi to P. V. Narsimha Rao to
Buta Singh and even to T. N. Seshan. He also reveals that most
of the dreaded terrorists were protégés of the government and
its intelligence agencies.
Even the Akalis
are not spared for mixing politics and religion. He writes:
"If religion has to be mixed with politics, sanity permits
only the import of religious morality and not its bigotry".
According to Sarab
Jit Singh’s assessment, decline of militancy began in April
1991. The "endgame" was in 1993. In between, he
describe the role of the state administration under different
Governors and Directors-General of Police, the deployment or
withdrawal of the Army, the Congress and Akali politicians and
key terrorist leaders and concludes, "It was power
politics, that created terrorism in Punjab and sustained it with
adverse consequences for the people, the administration, the
police force and the state as a whole".
The book is loaded
with facts and figures, numbers and statistics, dates and
details, which makes it a good reference work, though there is
unnecessary repetition of facts in the book. In the absence of
good photographs it becomes drab and academic. However, it does
show how from day one Sarab Jit Singh must have maintained a
record of the happenings over which he had direct control or to
which he was privy. The book is as much a personal tribute to
those who lost their lives or who are even today haunted by the
trauma of dislocation as it is a salute to Governor S. S. Ray.
Despite being a
bureaucrat, Sarab Jit Singh appears incisive when it comes to
inferences and interpretations of events or men and matters.
Operation Black Thunder was a major event during his five-year
tenure in Amritsar, the longest ever of a District Magistrate in
Amritsar in 140 years, as he puts it in the Preface. This earned
him a Padma Shri in 1989.
But credit must be
given to him for working so diligently on this book and
collecting details from friends, media persons and, of course, The
Tribune files. His exposure of Jasbir Singh Rode, the
desperation of the Home Ministry to resurrect him in Akal Takht,
exposure of under-cover police operations to dislodge Nirmal K
Mukerjee as Governor, the role of Gen O. P. Malhotra, who
submitted his resignation in protest against postponement of
Assembly elections in 1991, the professionalism of K. P. S.
Gill, the dubious role of Sikh institutes and politico-religious
personalities are all done in a candid manner.
He, somehow, has
been "soft" on the police, making only references to a
few of the cases of "excess" committed by the force.
But he does write with feeling on the attempts by state
Governors to restore peace or hold elections and how each time
these attempts were "deliberately sabotaged" by the
Centre as it had its own game plans. In so many words, he has
endorsed the oft-repeated assertion of the Akalis that the
Congress is "anti-Punjab, anti-Punjabis".
In this context he
uses the word "contrived" to describe the massacre of
Sikhs after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. His
prime ‘target’ remains the Congress, the Centre and the key
militants who connived to create a movement soaked in blood.
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