Sunday, November 17, 2002		Books

Underlining the importance of nuclear policy to national security
V. P. Malik

Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security
by Bharat Karnad. Macmillan India Limited, 2002.
Pages 724. Rs 795.

BHARAT Karnad’s Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security is about the ‘role that nuclear weapons have played from the very beginning in influencing Indian foreign and military policies, the evolution of Indian strategic thought, the country’s international posture and, especially, its national security outlook in the context of the larger and more diffuse cultural milieu, in which ancient wisdom prescribing the use of weapons of mass destruction coexists with modern concepts of total war’. It is essentially an inquiry into how and why India zigzagged its way into a position of nuclear reckoning but, time and again, fell short and continues to fall short.

The book advocates a maximalist, proactive approach for Indian security. While such a thought and approach is appreciated and generally supported; his research and analysis of India’s ‘realist foundations of strategy’ tends to betray his (lack of) ‘realistic’ understanding of India’s politico-military decision-making character.

According to Karnad, the USA’s imperial yearnings and its tendency to threaten manifestly unequal adversaries with the use of advanced nuclear and conventional military weapons or other non-military coercive means, has created a feeling of insecurity in the world. The attempt at imposing American solutions at the global level has affected the rest of the world, especially Russia, India and China. India and China require re-aligning their strategic plans and policies vis a vis the sole superpower during the current arms control winter. In such a strategic environment, the importance of nuclear weapons as the ultimate safeguard of sovereignty and enforcer of peace (on one’s own terms) has been significantly enhanced.

Karnad rightly expresses his concern over ethnic and communal tensions in India that may invite international intervention in the form of economic and political pressure, and at a later stage, even at a military level. While I agree that that due to a changed strategic environment and nature of conflict, there is a need to review many of our military combat organisations, I cannot endorse the solution that Karnad advocates, which requires the formation of commando units or special forces ‘to tackle sub limited wars, putting a stop to Islamabad brandishing the atomic bomb, mounting counter guerrilla campaign, operating deep in the enemy’s rear and generally to prosecuting all actions requiring stealth’. This shows ignorance of the existing, though inadequate, military organisations like the Para Commandos and the Rashtriya Rifles, as well as the Geneva Convention and International Laws of War. In fact, one of our problems is that we have too many of such special forces which do not have proper training, equipment and legal authority under the Ministries of Home, Defence, Cabinet Secretariat, and also at the state level.

Karnad rightly emphasises that the anti-terrorist military capability should not be achieved at the expense of nuclear weapons. He believes that India faces a latent threat from the USA on account of the Indian deterrent. The Indian deterrent will not only reduce the possibility of such a threat actually materialising into real action but also neutralise China’s centrality to Asian politics by exerting counter-pressure.

A strong votary of a great-power status on the basis of military power, Karnad has plenty to say about the lack of strategic mindset in the post-Nehru political leadership. He feels that the enervation of the Indian spirit, the weakness in national resolve and the haziness of vision are reflected mainly in India’s nuclear weapons policy and plans. He believes that India’s nuclear weapons strength will reinforce the territoriality of the state and also widen the range of economic capabilities. It will open the doors to the great-power club.

The biggest plus point of the book is that it exposes the lack of strategic thinking and weakness in our politico-military decision-making. At a time when most of our strategic thinkers and authors tend to follow western advice and writings, or only justify government decisions, Karnad’s book stands out for recommending proactive Indian strategic thought.

On the minus side, the economic, technological and safety factors required to maintain such a large inventory of strategic weapons and missiles have not been adequately calculated and factored in this otherwise very comprehensive study. There is also the evidence of the author’s lack of knowledge and experience of Indian governance.

Karnad’s immense research for the book is evident from its 723 references and 16 pages of index. But it also includes some ‘personal communications’ wherein names of people quoted have been held back and the given facts or statements have not been cross-checked with others.

An informative, stimulating and provocative book that makes a very useful contribution to India’s strategic thought and policies, particularly in the field of nuclear and other strategic weapon systems. A must-read for those interested in India’s national security.