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The book, which has been divided into three parts, fills a
much-regretted gap in India’s recent military history in the
study of Indo-Pakistan relations in recent years and Indian
security studies. While the first part dealing with the history
and genesis of the conflict contains four chapters, the second
part dealing with military conflict consists of seven chapters.
The third part contains six chapters, which deal with attempts
at the resolution of this conflict.
The first 44 pages
of the book contain a succinct description of the geography of
the region and historical explorations therein, beginning from
the early 19th century. More relevantly, this chapter contains
the history of explorations in the area in the pre-Partition
times up to the drawing of the Line of Control in 1972-73. The
remaining three chapters in the section, analysing the
geo-politics of the Karakoram in terms of Indian, Pakistani and
Chinese interests, in terms of the political and geo-political
compulsions impelling Indian and Pakistani policies towards the
Siachen area and the factual narrative about the beginning of
the dispute, provide perhaps the most comprehensive contextual
background of the conflict in the public domain so far, ensuring
an objective understanding of the reasons for the dispute. I
use the word "objective" because Raghavan’s
presentation scrupulously avoids any jingoistic overtones.
The second part
dealing with operational details of the conflict is again
compelling in focussing the reader’s attention because these
chapters are not merely a description of the battles and the
operational moves made by Pakistan and India to gain control
over the Saltoro ranges and adjacent glaciers. The author
analyses the problems related to soldiers adapting to high
altitudes, the enormous difficulties in providing logistical
support for maintaining military posts and in engaging in
battles and the general problems faced by both the Indian and
Pakistani forces involved.
Two chapters in
part two of the book titled "Two Different Battles"
and "The Logistical Battle" add to the chemistry of
courage, reasoned operational planning and profound commitment
to the tasks assigned to the Indian Army, which has underpinned
India’s success in holding on to the difficult heights at
Siachen and Saltoro. Whether holding on to the area is necessary
in terms of our substantive and strategic interests is a
different question, for which there is no clear answer given the
unexplainable aspects of Indo-Pakistan tensions and adversarial
attitudes. Raghavan’s description of the battle for the Bana
Post and the personal bravery of Naib Subedar Bana Singh is a
story that is not much known. One is glad that he has spared
space and time to recall the qualities of courage, drive,
dedication and commitment which characterised this operation and
which are more important in some respects than the material
inputs which go into a successful operation.
The author raises
a pertinent question in the book. He says, "Soldiers keep
faith amongst themselves but they some time wonder if those who
rule the nation will keep faith with them." Men and
mountains, soldiers and the Saltoro work a chemistry that shows
up the best facets of human character.
The third part of
the book, which deals with Indo-Pakistan negotiations to resolve
the Siachen conflict, is valuable in its descriptive content.
Raghavan does not make any value judgement whether both India
and Pakistan should have implemented the compromises, which they
very nearly reached at the end of the sixth round of
Indo-Pakistan talks on Siachen in early November 1992.
Two interesting
points brought out by General Raghavan merit being noted. First,
he has brought out the geographical distinction between the
Siachen glacier and the Saltoro range. The two territorial
phenomenon are often confused by the general public. Secondly,
he has given information and analysis leading to the conclusion
that the origins of the Kargil War in the summer of 1999 lay in
the failure of Pakistan to capture the Saltoro heights, despite
repeated attempts between 1986 and 1988.
The General has
enhanced the value of the book as an important work of archival
reference by using maps of the Saltoro region, which he drew up
himself. The photographs give the reader some idea of the
difficult and forbidding terrain. Bibliographical and reference
notes classified subject wise indicate that he has written the
book not only on the basis of memory and his personal experience
but also on the basis of detailed research. The contents of the
book, apart from reflecting his personal knowledge and
experience, also reflect the scholarly precision with which he
authored this important work. This is the first lucid,
comprehensive and fairly clinical account of the Indo-Pakistan
confrontation at Siachen. In some respects contents of the book
and its sub-title embryonically reflect the larger
intransigencies between India and Pakistan. Given the present
political standoff between them, and its implication for the
regional security environment, this book is a timely and
thoughtful addition to the reference material on Indo-Pakistan
relations.
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THE
Indo-Pakistan conflict in the Siachen area on the northern edge of
Jammu and Kashmir has been a point of attention since 1983. The
confrontation has also been the subject matter of negotiations
between Pakistan and India between 1986 and 1992. The negotiations
were for mutual re-deployment of forces from their present
adversarial locations. The military standoff at Siachen has also
been the subject matter of comment and analysis over the years. It
constituted one of the important and separate items on the agenda of
Foreign Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan,
particularly between 1988 and 1997. Despite the official and
non-official attention the analyses and writings on the subject have
been episodic and fragmented.
