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The Soviets invaded Afghanistan, though officially they had been
‘invited’ in by President Hafizullah Amin in terms of the
Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Americans, not realising
that this move was only locally oriented towards Afghanistan,
rushed in to safeguard their own interests in the region as also
to counter the Soviet influence at any cost. They ended up
propping up Pakistan as a frontline state from where they could
checkmate the designs of the Russians through a proxy war. When
the Russians departed in 1989, they left behind a splintered
Afghanistan, where the likes of Rabbani, Hekmetyar and
Najibullah continued to battle it out overtly and covertly for
the control of the Army and Kabul. Finally, the day came in the
early 1990s for the victorious drive of the Pakistani-controlled
Taliban and the rout of the present-day Northern Alliance into
the one-fourth remaining part of Northern Afghanistan. Mehta's
book ends with a short resume of the September attacks on the
USA, and a quick peep into what the future could hold for
Afghanistan.
Mehta rightly says
that the ill-conceived Soviet invasion, which many in the USSR
had spoken against even then, and the US counter-retort in
arming and supporting Pakistan, led to the "remilitarisation"
of the subcontinent. It was also the cause of planned assembling
by the CIA and other covert agencies of the Islamic
fundamentalists to carry out depredations inside Afghanistan
leading to its social, economic and political degradation.
To compound
matters for President Najibullah, the last pro-communist head,
Pakistan’s acts of omission and commission led to the Taliban
radicals overrunning the country and assuming a fragmentary and
harsh control over a war-ravaged land. The Taliban misrule could
have continued for long, had the Twin Towers’ bombings not
taken place. In a manner similar to that of the Soviets, 22
years earlier, the USA intervened in Afghanistan and initiated
military action against Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaida gangs.
Mehta's account, a
reprint of papers on the region written earlier, recounts how
India made its biggest diplomatic policy mistake by betraying
the Afghan people and itself and by not castigating the Soviet
Union at the UN for its entry into Afghanistan. He talks of his
'prophylactic' diplomacy in trying to save the subcontinent, the
"Finlandisation" plan for Afghanistan at one time that
he had mooted, and efforts at convincing the world polity,
especially the Russians, that a neutral and non-aligned
democracy in Afghanistan was the only answer for a troubled
South Asia.
That Afghanistan
today finds itself in a little mess only highlights the
inefficacy of the foreign policy makers in Washington and
Moscow, and the short-nosed policy of both India and Pakistan
who, engrossed in their own firefight over the decades, have
completely forgotten the welfare and well-being of a not so
well-to-do neighbour.
Mehta is all for
nations themselves trying to sort out their problems as and when
they occur, and is of the view that the days of the godfathers
are long over. Mehta's parting advice is that India and the USA
should remain 'steady on the course' in finding a diplomatic
solution to the travails of Afghanistan. Will the Indo-US
bonding, affected post-Kargil, measure up to finding a permanent
solution there? Whether this will be over and above the
frontline status afforded to Pakistan in fighting terrorism and
the Al Qaida is of course a different matter.
Jagat Mehta has
written an extremely interesting and information-packed book.
For many of us who have served there when history was in the
making, nothing would be more satisfying than seeing a change of
track in our diplomatic thrusts, where we once again realign
ourselves to the betterment of the Afghan people. Mehta's
straight-from-the-shoulder, no-nonsense account, laced with an
honesty of purpose meant for every Afghani, should be compulsory
reading for all Indian diplomats, who really wish to call
themselves diplomats and not convenient doormats of the reigning
government in New Delhi at any moment of time.
If Mehta was
'removed' from the post of Foreign Secretary in November 1979,
so be it. After this book, I think, he has had the last word.
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