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Dixit's book is narrated in the
reverse order from the IC-814 episode in Kandahar to the Kargil
war, through the years of strife and coups in Pakistan from 1972
to 1999, the bone of contention of Kashmir, the Agra summit and
before that the Lahore bus diplomacy. Furthermore, the nuclear
weapons status of the two perpetually warring countries covers
nearly all that there is to cover in the turbulent Indo-Pak
relations ever since the creation of Pakistan.The positive US
stance towards India during the Kargil war and the ongoing war
against terrorism where India's expanded defence cooperation
with America puts her centre-stage as a major player engaged in
eradicating global terror and transborder strife,marks her out
as a fast emerging Asian power. India can easily act as an
effective counter-weight to the increasing global hold of China
in this critically live and dangerous region.In rounding off his
prognosis on Pakistan at the very end of his account, Dixit
opines that Pakistan has been provided an opportunity for moving
towards a "reasonable dialogue" with India, provided
there "is a fundamental transformation of the power
structure in Pakistan,not only in terms of its military
components but also in terms of the social background and
political inclinations of the plutocratic and feudal leadership
of the major political parties of Pakistan." It does
appear, however, that it is a long way off before Pakistan can
come anywhere near Dixit's expectations. Pakistan's policy
projections today revolve around one man,Gen Pervez Musharraf,
who has armed himself with an engineered referendum of
popularity and an Army that will not very readily give up the
power and pelf that it has enjoyed ever since the birth of
Pakistan.
Dixit has held
back on nothing and it is heartening to see his treatment of the
K Subrahmanyam- led Kargil Review Committee Report, which in the
view of this writer who has known Kargil well,was little more
than a feeble After Action Report. Much of its input came from
serving defence sources who, as per the rules, are forbidden to
speak. They also work in a water-tight,compartmentalised
environment even at the best of times.There has been a
"deliberate reticence" in the report in highlighting
the failures and shortcomings in the senior command structure in
the Northern Command, Dixit very rightly points out in his
incisive analysis.Only Brigadier Surinder Singh, Commander of
the Kargil Brigade, was singled out in the report "for
failing to make correct assessments and not having initiated
relevant anticipatory action."Even a babe in uniform would
have known that, in addition to Brig Singh, the entire pecking
order from the Divisional Commander,the Corps Commander, the
Northern Army Commander ,and, in the opinion of many a seasoned
defence analyst, even the then Chief of the Army Staff,should
have been asked to explain their acts of omission or commission
in the monumental failure of intelligence at Kargil.
Their command
responses at the time, especially during the initial stages of
the war, were far from satisfactory. That nothing of the kind
happened and only one poor Brigadier was packed off home speaks
volumes of the failing standards in accountability and a moral
standards of taking the blame as a senior. Such incidents also
show the true worth of review committee reports and other
inquiry reports like the Henderson Brooks report of 1962, which
if not made public in full ,will always fail to instill
confidence within and outside the armed forces.
Dixit's close
proximity to power and a marked ability in handling
international relations and crisis management in the diplomatic
arena, single him out from the ordinary bureaucrat who these
days are hell bent on writing a book after they relinquish
office.There is nothing startlingly juicy in this book, but the
strength and substance lies in a thorough dissection of over 50
years of our history. Useful annexures covering the Lahore
Declaration, the Shimla Agreement and the India-Pakistan
Military Balance add content and continuity to the book. As he
writes from personal experience in much of what he has
narrated,there is little need of props of any kind to enliven
his account.
There is one
catchy account of the "public relations exercise of the
Pakistani government to use Indian journalists and political
commentators to generate dissension in Indian policies,"
which Dixit highlights and which would be worthy of note. Dixit
writes in this connection,"I must mention Pakistan has made
this attempt with senior and thoughtful journalists like George
Verghese, Pran Chopra, the late Dilip Mukherjee, Ajit
Bhattacharya, Bhabani Sen Gupta,and the late Rajinder Sareen.But
in overall terms, this Pakistani effort has not succeeded."
One wonders what some of the personalities mentioned would make
of this statement.
This is a must
read for all segments of the Indian society that wishes to truly
understand the chemistry of the volatile Indo-Pakistani
relationship.
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THERE
have been many from the Indian Foreign Service, including a
dozen-odd former Foreign Secretaries, who have not written a
word about their experiences and assessments while in
service,and have in the process deprived readers of their
share of an interesting slice of history. Happily, Dixit, who
has been India’s man in Afghanistan,Sri Lanka and
Pakistan,and knows the people,politics and the geography of
the region well,has continued to keep his pen moving and has
now come out with a block-buster of a book on Indo-Pakistan
relations over the years. This incisive, honestly written and
well-documented 500 pager tells the troubled story of two
neighbouring nations who have not learnt to live in peace with
each other.
