Sunday, June 2, 2002		Books

India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenals)
by Ashley J.Tellis. Oxford University Press, New Delhi. Pages 885. Price Rs 895.

THE book under review is an attempt to assess the emerging nuclear posture of India, subsequent to the series of nuclear tests carried out in 1998. The event not only proved to be a major technological milestone for the country but also served as a political expedience for the party in power, besides becoming a maiden intelligence feat owing to the hoodwinking of major powers, including the USA.

The principal objective of the book, the author claims, is to prepare US policy makers for the prospective development pertaining to nuclearisation in India. Authored by Ashley J.Tellis, the book is a Rand-sponsored study(under Project Air Force). Interestingly, any promotional activity linked to India’s strategic growth generally invites special concern of the West particularly the USA, and this meaningful volume of 885 pages, spread into six chapters, is no different.

In this comprehensive examination of India’s nuclear strategy, the author addresses-issues in the context of a broader understanding of India’s strategic interests, its institutional structure and its security goal. He argues that truth is much more complex than most analysts believe it to be and that despite demonstrating an ability to successfully undertake nuclear explosions, India still has a long way to go before it can acquire the capabilities that would make it a nuclear power of consequence.

Explaining the heritage of nuclear ambiguity in the chapter on strategic factors affecting India’s nuclear power", the author says that even though India’s nuclear programme dates back to the pre1947 period, yet the strategic environment the country faced after Independence did not demand that any clear decision be made regarding its nuclear status. Instead, the traditional nuclear posture continued to pivot on ‘keeping the option open’.

He talks of four variables influencing India’s nuclear posture. It includes characters of global nuclear regime, demand by regional security and threats, bilateral relations with key powers and opportunities offered by indigenous performance. Elaborating on his own views, Ashley says that if the global nuclear regime is a mixed bag, the regional nuclear environment is considered more ominous by Indian policy makers.

The author has provided a detailed account of the growing nuclear potential of China and Pakistan, including delivery system capable of covering principal Indian targets, which still are defenseless notwithstanding the country’s impressive achievements on the nuclear front.

In his intuitive assumption that India will not return to maintaining option, Ashley has suggested five distinct nuclear postures to choose from. However, cautions the author, any runaway expansion of India’s strategic programme might put New Delhi at a great disadvantage in its relationship with Washington. At the same time, it is debatable whether developing any robust nuclear force would enhance India’s security in the regional set-up.

In the chapter on "towards a force in being and understanding nuclear doctrine," the author puts forth an argument fraught with uncertainty. For instance, the draft report of the NSAB on Indian nuclear doctrine, officially released on August 17, 1999, continues to suffer from ambiguity with respect to its status as a policy document. However, the most significant and distinguishing facet of the doctrine is its consistent claim that nuclear weapons are more political instruments than military tools. Adding to this defensive outlook is development of a modest nuclear deterrent with emphasis on punitive retaliation as the focus of country’s operational policy. But even in this, according to the author, India has not addressed any issue pertaining to the character, extent or weight of Indian retaliatory action corroborating the views of Raymond Barre, who argued that it is not possible or desirable to define punitive retaliation since the employment policy is not fixed.

In the chapter, "Towards a force in being: accessing the requirements and adequacy of the evolving deterrent", the author has given an account of what India has and what it hasn’t. There is growing evidence that India has begun to focus on increasing its available stockpile of weapon-grade material. The BARC, for example, has been removed from supervisory purview of the Regulatory Board. According to the report, India possesses three kinds of nuclear weapons but the fact is mired in controversy on technical reasons. Ashley even contests the claims of Kalam, who said that our weaponisation is complete, by refuting that it has just begun in India.

Looking at India’s capabilities, the author points out a monadic delivery force consisting of only short-range, not all-weather tactical aircraft. Amongst missiles, Agni is only designated for improved range.

In the last chapter, the author mentions of no dramatic change in Delhi’s strategic capability but signals a critical shift. This portends more of an equilibrium change with strategic consequences for both China and Pakistan. Finally, giving an American perspective in the South-Asian context, Ashley says that the USA should concentrate on India (Pakistan) nuclear arsenals by de-emphasising their provocative strategic posture. There is a need for a realistic strategic vision between India and the USA and clear articulation of this alone can respond to Indian nuclearisation in an effective manner.

The author can be complimented for amassing a rich bibliography for his scholarly work. The book is a must for specialists, policy-makers, analysts and researchers engaged in strategic and international studies across the globe.