It may seem incredible, but it is true that Indian leaders lead
by Pandit Nehru willingly handed over control of the security
and defence of the country to the British against whom they had
been struggling for independence for so many years.
Surprisingly, neither the Indian leaders, nor the intellectuals
or the general public objected to this handing over of the
control of the country's defence forces as well as its defence
policy to the British. No wonder these British officers were
able to harm India's national interests in Jammu and Kashmir in
1947-48. This is the most revealing and interesting part of the
book which deals with war and diplomacy in Kashmir in 1947-48.
The author asks
searching questions as to why India did not carry war into
Pakistan in 1947-48 as she was to do in 1965? Why was no serious
effort made to clear the Pakistani forces from J&K? Why did
India accept a cease-fire when she clearly had military
superiority? This well-written book tackles these questions in a
rational and analytical manner by referring to British records.
In the
introduction, the author states that the conflict which broke
out between India and Pakistan was unique in that the opposing
armies of both the independent states of India and Pakistan were
commanded by British generals who were in a unique position to
influence the course of the military action. Yet, curiously,
their role has received little attention in India, states the
author with good reason. The book brings out how the Atlee
Government in the UK, Mountbatten and the British generals in
India and General Gracey, British C-in-C of Pakistani army,
cleverly stopped India from making full use of its military
strength to throw out Pakistani forces from J&K or to attack
Pakistan in 1947-48.
That Pakistani
forces were in no position to fight against the Indian armed
forces in 1947-48 is brought out by the author who quotes
records of the meeting between Mountbatten and General Gracey.
"I asked him how the Pakistan armed forces stood in
relation to war. How ready were they if war came between the two
dominions? General Gracey shrugged his shoulders and said
"Pakistan has not got a hope. The air force can hardly take
to the air. The army, such as it is, quite efficient, but it is
half the size of the army of India and has no proper backing.
The Pakistan army would run out of ammunition very quickly
indeed in the event of any large scale engagement and there were
no ammunition factories of any type in Pakistan to replenish the
stocks. In fact, any war between the two dominions, Pakistan
would be completely defeated militarily in a fairly short
time."
So the British
interests in looking after Pakistan required preventing an
all-out inter-dominion war and ensuring that Mountbatten
projected to Indian leaders a deliberately exaggerated picture
of India's military limitations, vis-a-vis Pakistan. The British
C-in-C and other British senior officers followed the same
pattern while discussing the matter with Indian leaders. It was
a well-planned strategy that worked. The British generals and
Pakistan wanted that the Indian Army should not be allowed to
advance beyond the line of Uri-Poonch-Naushera in J&K. The
British C-in-C of the Indian Army did not send more troops to
J&K on one pretext or another, so that Indian forces could
not launch a proper offensive to throw out Pakistani forces from
J&K.
In order to
ensure the success of their gameplan, General Busher, C-in-C
Indian Army, issued a directive on July 6, 1948, to General
Cariappa in J&K that no major operation should be undertaken
without approval of Army HQ. The author states that "Busher
also seems to have explored secret understanding with Gracey
(C-in-C Pak Army)."
I invited Field
Marshal Cariappa to give a talk to the cadets when I was
Commandant IMA in 1980. Cariappa told me that General Busher
used to pass information to General Gracey regarding the
operations he intended to launch in J&K and so he used to
keep secret his plans from Army HQ at New Delhi! Prime Minister
Nehru suggested more than once that the Indian Army should be
used to attack Pakistani bases from where the raiders were
planning to attack certain targets in J&K and Pakistan but
his suggestions were always overlooked due to opposition by
Mountbatten and General Busher.
The book states
that it was on the advice of Mountbatten that India took the
case to the United Nations. The superior Indian army could not
attack Pak bases or launch a bigger offensive in J&K because
the British C-in-C and Mountbatten were deadly against such
actions and somehow managed to persuade Indian leaders to give
up such plans. Yet Indian leaders did not take any action
against them or replace them with Indian generals.
This is a well-documented and
thoughtfully written book that throws new light on operations in
J&K in 1947-48. It should make a useful addition to any
library.
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