The Tribune - Spectrum

ART & LITERATURE
'ART AND SOUL
BOOKS
MUSINGS
TIME OFF
YOUR OPTION
ENTERTAINMENT
BOLLYWOOD BHELPURI
TELEVISION
WIDE ANGLE
FITNESS
GARDEN LIFE
NATURE
SUGAR 'N' SPICE
CONSUMER ALERT
TRAVEL
INTERACTIVE FEATURES
CAPTION CONTEST
FEEDBACK

Sunday
, February 3, 2002
Books

If machines become conscious, would they remain machines?
Review by Kuldip Dhiman

Mind, Matter, and Mystery: Questions in Science and Philosophy
edited by Ranjit Nair. Scientia, New Delhi. Pages 148. Rs 195.

WHEN IBM’s Deep Blue supercomputer played a fascinating match with the reigning world chess champion, Garry Kasparov, and defeated him in one of the games, the latter acquired the dubious distinction of becoming the first grandmaster to have been defeated by a computer. Later the grandmaster admitted that he had learnt a lot from Deep Blue as it "thought" differently from humans. Back in their office, the designers of Deep Blue must have been amused by the statement, for they knew that Deep Blue often makes some silly chess moves, and actually it does not "understand" chess at all! This is a perplexing thought, if Deep Blue did not understand chess, how did it defeat one of the great players of all time?

The issue whether machines can have any consciousness is addressed by Roger Penrose, in the lecture "Can a computer understand?´in the book "Mind, Matter and Mystery" edited by Ranjit Nair. Dismissing the present-day computer as a mere processing machine devoid of any understanding of mathematics, Penrose stresses the fact that the quality of understanding is, in a sense, complementary to computation. "A computation unaccompanied by understanding," he says, "is of no actual value. One needs to know what a computation is for, and why some particular result of a computation should have any particular implication. Sometimes there is a trade-off between understanding and computation. By use of more understanding in a problem, one may be able to circumvent a large amount of computation; conversely, a lot of number-crunching or the working through of vast arrays of different possibilities may, in certain cases, act as a substitute for a deeper understanding of a problem."

 


Arguing further Penrose says that understanding is a quality that requires genuine awareness. He also admits that he does not know what "awareness" is, any more than he knows what "understanding" is. "Yet, it seems clear that without awareness, genuine understanding (in the usual use of that word) cannot be present. To be fully aware of the situation is, indeed, the first step towards understanding it. Thus, if we can see that the effects of understanding are not achievable purely computationally, then this strongly indicates that it may be awareness itself that is the non-computational ingredient. In any case, if the effects of understanding are beyond computation, from then there is fundamentally lacking in the purely computational model of the mind."

Penrose argues that humans stood a better chance in the evolutionary struggle because they had the ability to understand mathematics and could compute. An ‘"understanding" of numbers could come about in an entirely computationally describable way. Accordingly, it was the computer-like response of our remote ancestors to their environment that produced "understanding". In their experiences they would have come across small numbers of objects and then larger and larger collections, finding that it was to their advantage (and to their evolutionary "fitness") to be able to count them consistently, and then to ad and subtract them.

This excellent little book is a collection of lectures and interviews arranged by the Centre for Philosophy and Foundations of Science (CPFS), which has its main aim to bring philosophy and physics back on the same road again. After parting ways and going their separate ways about the time of Newton and Galileo, philosophy and science seem to have come a full circle. It would surprise many that these days, papers published in scientific journals may be about subjects that were beyond the purview of modern science, especially physics, and similarly in philosophical journals you might find papers on general relativity and quantum mechanics. For instance, most of us would not expect Roger Penrose, an acclaimed mathematician and physicist, known for his work with Stephen Hawking on black holes and the big bang to be concerned about mind and consciousness. But that is exactly what he seems to be dong, and doing it very well.

Later in an interview with Ranjit Nair, Penrose sums up his position: "The basic argument is that mathematical understanding —I would like to use the word ‘understanding’ as the key word in my own considerations— is beyond the scope of any computation.

Take any computer activity, and no matter how cleverly it can perform elaborate functions, there is no understanding present in that activity. Understanding requires awareness — it is one feature of our awareness, and that’s the only one I can get a real handle on. But from there I would say it is unreasonable to draw a line between our understanding of mathematics and our understanding of other things, for example, the appreciation of a musical sound or a beautiful scene or the feeling of pain. All these qualities are more obviously outside computation."

Along with the question of mind and matter, there is also the perplexing notion of time, and the issue is well addressed by E. C. G. Sudarshan in the lecture "Does time go forward? It was Einstein who changed our commonsense view of time by linking space and time about a century ago. While addressing the question of time, Sudarshan says, we find ourselves caught between two conflicting theories: quantum mechanics and thermodynamics.

Mechanics tells us that time does not travel in a linear fashion, (in other words, there is nothing like past, present and future, just as there is no reference point in the universe such as up or down or north or south) that is there is nothing that has ‘happened’ cannot ‘unhappen’, while thermodynamics says processes do not happen in the reverse unless there is external intervention. Sudarshan wonders if there are irreversible processes in nature and how could they be accommodated alongside reversible processes?

Similar questions are addressed in Ilya Prigogine interview with Ranjit Nair "Creativity, change and time’s arrow". Interested readers might find it fruitful to compare these two with the chapter "The Arrow of Time" in Stephen Hawking’s much acclaimed book "A Brief History of Time".

Ranjit Nair’s own lecture "Can science comprehend consciousness?" deals with the fact that while all scientific enquiry is by nature objective or third person narrative, the realm of consciousness is actually a subjective or first person narrative. Quoting Ervin Schrodinger he says, "The spirit, strictly speaking can never be the object of scientific inquiry, because objective knowledge of the spirit is a contradiction of terms.

Yet, on the other hand, all knowledge relates to the spirit or, more properly, exists in it, and that is the sole reason for our interest in any field of knowledge whatsoever." Nair reminds us that Sankaracharya also believed that knowledge in general has to be objective.

Here Nair also forwards a counter argument to the principle of objectivity, that knowledge is itself a kind of mental activity, and hence could not be objective. Wilhelm Halbfass comments on the concept of akasha or ether, one of the five elements as mentioned in Indian philosophy, while Michel Bitbol discusses quantum jumps.

Philosophy and science became almost antagonistic towards each other so much so that, in the age of Newton, as Ranjit Nair remarks in the editor’s note, "Locke would have the philosopher serve as under-labourer to science, while in the age of Einstein, Wittgenstein would seemingly do away with philosophy altogether." But happily for us, things are changing. This book reminds us that science without philosophy is like computation without understanding.