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Pakistan was a divided nation at birth. Islam provided it with
its life force but it could not promote national solidarity.
This is the central paradox in Pakistan’s story and it holds
as much significance today as it did 54 years ago. The
"Islam in danger" slogan galvanised an ethically
diverse and otherwise desperate people into a massive demand
for national self-determination. Fear, however, is a negative
force and of little value in building a community let alone a
nation. None expressed this thought better than Jinnah who
once having achieved Pakistan, was burdened with the awesome
task of reducing those suspicions which he so artfully
exploited in the struggle for statehood. As the Governor
General of the new state and the people’s Quaid-i-Azam
(great leader), Jinnah insisted that Pakistan’s primary
concern must be the promotion of principles of equality and
social justice for all its citizens.
His Pakistan
may have been realised through religious expression but he
believed that it could be sustained only through secular
procedures. Before his death in September, 1948, he
acknowledged that the job of holding Pakistan would be far
more difficult than the one that made independence possible.
And the
events which followed proved that he was right. In these
decades of its history every major political change has been
witness to nerve-racking twists and turns. Smooth transition
has hardly been the rule there. After Jinnah, Liaquat Ali’s
assassination led to a protracted period of uncertainty which
culminated in military dictatorship-first of General Iskandar
Mirza and then of General Ayub Khan. And when Ayub Khan was
discredited, General Yahya Khan took over and he had to quit
when he lost Bangladesh for Pakistan, which led to Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto stepping into power. And when he gained legitimacy
by winning a general election, he was imprisoned and finally
executed by General Zia-ul-Haq.
When General
Zia died in an mysterious air crash, a fresh round of
uncertainty set in, which saw Benazir in power briefly,
followed by ups and downs, and again general elections brought
her back to power. After a brief period of political
uncertainty she was succeeded by Mian Nawaz Sharif who was
overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif has taken
political asylum in Saudi Arabia. On June 20, 2001, General
Musharraf appointed himself as President of Pakistan. The
interludes are not only exciting but also revealing of the
fragility of the system in Pakistan.
A war -
conventional, nuclear or even proxy — is no option for India
and Pakistan. For Pakistan it is just not winnable in military
terms and for India it is simply not affordable in economic
terms.
I fully agree
with the main contention of the author of this volume under
review that relations with neighbours are not an end in
themselves, nor is national security. They are among the means
to protect and further the national interests which cannot be
sacrificed out of sentimental concern for those near to us,
nor for building international images. The healthier a nation,
the more effective will be its external relations.
Without
necessarily being self-centred, one has to accept that India
is central to this region and that none of the countries in
the immediate neighbourhood (why to accuse Pakistan only?)
particularly relishes this fact. But India cannot change
geographically and there is no way it can remove its
neighbours’ apprehensions arising out of size and location.
It has survived internal or external attacks, it still has to
be safeguarded against fissiparous forces and those external
ones that are envious, fearful or both.
If India were
to be a fully developed nation-state, the turbulence in our
particular area might abate. If the pivotal country in the
region is seen to be strong, stable and totally integrated,
the fear, real or imaginary, of the neighbours would be
stilled in the sense that no country seeks to upset the
balance. Not only would this curb the trend on the part of
neighbours to indulge in pinpricks but also diminish the urge
to acquire extra-regional linkages since India could more
easily provide both economic and security help. It might also
be that the instinct of imitation, if nothing else, would
encourage other countries to settle down.
If, on the
other hand, there is a situation of flux in India, this will
affect the entire region and invite all kinds of adventurous
policies, both from within the region and interference by
outside powers. However, it is unlikely that this particular
thesis will find much acceptance outside India. The paradox of
the Third World countries is that they are more afraid of
dominance, real but often imaginary, by one of themselves than
by their erstwhile masters or their successors. Regrettably,
therefore, many of our neighbours show less interest in the
integrity or development of this country than India does in
theirs.
This work
provides a comprehensive explanation and analysis of India’s
Pakistan policy in the context of emerging security issues and
concerns. As the importance of strategic perspective to India’s
foreign policy is growing in the post-Pokhran II period, the
main objective of this study is to develop a conceptual
framework of India’s national security and explain the major
issues and disputes between India and Pakistan, and India’s
threat perception and policy response within that framework.
The study has imparted a theoretical thrust to make it a
serious academic work.
The scope and
nature of the study make it different from other recent works
on Indo-Pakistan relations.
It also attempts to explore
new facts and analyses policy initiates afresh. The mos recent
changes and developments in regard to the issues such as
irredentism or the Kashmir issue, arms race and the nuclear
issue, interventionist role of the great powers, Pakistan’s
support to terrorism and secessionism in India have been
objectively assessed. The book provides interesting details
about the role of the non-elected institutions in influencing
security perceptions and crucial policy decisions, adequacy of
India’s Kashmir policy and nuclear deterrence,
reactive-proactive, deliberate dilution and limitations of
India’s bilateral approach vis-à-vis Pakistan, and the
rationale and implications of India’s new policy moves such
as composite dialogue or no dialogue with Pakistan. It has
also examined as to how India’s external security and
defence policies, though in their theoretical formulations are
officially described as holistic and security-specific, in
practice the Indian state behaviour has reflected obsession
with the Pakistan factor.
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