"Kargil has been Pakistan’s biggest blunder. Pakistani people who were told that Pakistan is winning the War, are bewildered and humiliated’

— Benazir Bhutto
— The Asian Age
August 5, 1999

— Imtiaz Alam
— News
July 19, 1999

— Editorial in the Jung

The first and foremost is the need to check whether there are chinks in the armour of our operational deployment and associated intelligence set up along the LoC. The raising of a new Corps at Leh started off with a bang but ended in a whimper when even before the newly appointed Corps Commander had settled in. It became necessary for the government to remove him from his command on certain grounds. Besides being detrimental to the morale of the troops serving in that theatre, it speaks volumes of our entire selection, appointment and placement procedure in the Military Secretary’s branch in Army Headquarters, the Ministry of Defence and the high-powered Cabinet Appointment Committee of the GOI. An army is as good as the generals who lead it and it is time we evolved a fool-proof system where only people who are the best rise to the top of our armed forces. Why was the deficiency in this particular officer not detected in time?

The second point in the same arena of morale and management is that if government has found it necessary to remove Brigadier Surindar Singh, the Commander of the 121 Indep Brigade Group at Kargil, it must be seen to that others in the chain of command, who are supposed to be in the know of the ground situation in the Indian Army’s ‘two or three up system’ of reporting and subsequent command and control, are also held responsible for the lapse. The buck does not stop at Brigadier Surindar Singh’s doorstep only. The then Divisional Commander at Leh, the then GOC of the Corps controlling the operation from Srinagar and, finally, the Army Commander at Udhampur in the Northern Command are all responsible, (each at his own level), for what transpired at Kargil last year.For the layman, all INTSUMS, Intelligence Summaries, SITREPS or Situation Report, and other essential reportage is flashed all the way up the channel of command, and intervening Commanders are expected to guide, change, recommend decisions depending on their jurisdiction and delegated powers.

The third concern is that early warning battlefield radars, snowmobiles, replacement for the ageing Bofors guns, lighter pack and web equipment, battlefield Night Vision Devices, faster casualty evacuation by helicopters and, in many cases, mulepack, safer ammunition dumps etc are taken care of without delay. An assured parallel road communication network along the Zoji La-Kargil-Leh road, and rigorous and intensive patrolling along the border are a few of the improvements that should be affected, for an assured operational and logistic infrastructure is the best recipe for a winning army.

The other matter which must be looked into with all due care is the welfare of not only the serving soldiers but also the ex-servicemen. It is a matter of deep regret that at a function at Anandpur Sahib last year, George Fernandes had promised to usher in the "one rank, one pension" dispensation for not only the officers but the JCOs and Other Ranks as well "within weeks." He has, to date, been unable to carry out his own wishes.

It is of utmost importance that when a soldier dies in battle, his family is adequately looked after and provided for by the country. We need a separate full-fledged Ministry at the Centre looking after just the ex-servicemen and their families. The ex-servicemen should not be looked upon as vote banks. They are a vital segment of our society on whom the nation can bank on during adversity or emergency.

One year after Kargil, one hopes that we are giving attention to one or two other crucial matters as well. Proxy voting should be affected forthwith so that a soldier and his family emerge with a stronger political clout than has been the case so far. Furthermore, two years of compulsory military service (in training establishments and not in the field), for all able-bodied men at college and university level should also be introduced. This will help in toning up the young, who today feel that they must have all the privileges that the State can offer them but do nothing in return. A disciplined, partially-trained reserve force, to be called up in any emergency is the need of the hour.

One year after Kargil, we must seriously ponder over all these issues. Specially selected, top- of- the- line serving and retired defence officers must be incorporated at the highest defence level of decision-making of the national security apparatus, and the entire integrated intelligence network of the country reinstalled with more representation from the Services. An allocations of at least 30 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) to the defence sector would ensure timely re-equipment and modernisation of the armed forces. And, finally, the soldiers must be given their respect so that the armed forces draw in the cream of the society. If after Kargil we have not learnt these lessons, all the gains would have gone in vain.