The celebration is over

Now it’s time to deliver, Mr CM
By Yoginder Gupta

HARYANA CHIEF MINISTER Om Prakash Chautala’s gamble has paid off! By going to the electorate 18 months ahead of the statutory requirement, Chautala took a calculated risk. Aware of the mercurial temperament of the Haryana electorate, Chautala knew that even the best of performances could not make a favourable verdict a certainty for him in 2001.

With the Congress in disarray and the state unit fragmented into groups and sub-groups, it was the most opportune time for the INLD to make a bid to recapture power which had come to it through the ‘backdoor.’ Moreover, it would have been well-nigh impossible to sustain the populism unleashed by Chautala during six months of his borrowed rule till the normal expiry of the term of the House, without matching the cost with additional resources. The wave of the 1999 Lok Sabha poll was already waning. The raising of additional resources needs hard decisions, which never fetch votes.

After testing electoral waters in the Lok Sabha elections, Chautala would have gone for immediate assembly elections. But he knew that the Election Commission would hold the elections in Haryana along with those in Bihar, Orissa and Manipur. Therefore, he decided to mark time. The populist measures were funded by borrowing money from cash-rich boards and corporations.

The run-up to the elections was not an entirely smooth affair for the INLD. It was locked in a bitter squabble with the BJP over the sharing of seats. It was obvious that the alliance was not based on trust. The BJPwanted the INLDto be dependent upon it in the post-poll scenario. Therefore, it demanded 35 seats, which were clearly beyond its capacity to contest. Its thinking was that the INLD would not be able to get an absolute majority on its own by contesting 55 seats in the House of 90. Chautala, who understood the BJP gameplan well, retracted his promise of leaving 35 seats for the BJPonce the House was dissolved.

But it was Chautala’s political compulsion to go along with the BJP. From his experience in 1996, he knew the importance of the BJP as an electoral ally. He missed the bus four years ago because the BJP opted for Bansi Lal. In the context of Haryana, the position of the BJP is like a "zero" which when placed after one makes it 10. Separately, both are not very significant. Grudgingly, he conceded 29 seats to the BJP, keeping only 61 with him.

Smarting under hard bargaining by the BJP, the INLD leader set in motion a plan which would cut his alliance partner to size. He was unwittingly helped to a large extent by the Congress. Notwithstanding the Pachmarhi Resolution, the Congress could not finalise its candidates until the last. Thus the party missed an opportunity to send a positive message about its unity while the INLD and the BJP were wrangling with each other. Chautala, on the other hand, had announced the names of his candidates for almost all the constituencies he intended to contest even before the dispute with the BJP was settled.

The Congress also bungled in the selection of its candidates in several constituencies. It preferred to accommodate claims and counter-claims of various group leaders as well as proteges of certain Central leaders rather than going for the winning ability of the candidates. At least seven aspirants for the Congress ticket have won either as Independents or as nominees of other parties. No wonder several party workers want action against those leaders who were responsible for the denial of the party ticket to the winning candidates.

Once the Congress list was out, a message went out in the state that the party was not in the reckoning for the formation of the government. Chautala emerged as the "most probable" Chief Minister candidate. This further helped to swing a certain percentage of the floating vote towards the INLD, which ultimately secured an absolute majority on its own by winning 47 of the 90 seats. The BJP was humiliated with just six seats in its kitty.

A senior youth INLD leader said the circumstances were benevolent towards Chautala. Several factors combined to ensure his victory. The panchayat elections, which would have divided the village community, were delayed. The elections were held before the presentation of the Union Budget and the Congress bungled in the selection of its candidates.

It is for the first time that Chautala has come out of the shadow of his father, Devi Lal. He successfully managed what was entirely his own show, with Devi Lal playing only a supporting role. Chautala not only managed to get rid of the HVP defectors but he also effectively kicked away the BJP crutches. The BJP was left with no choice but to extend outside support to Chautala despite anger among its ranks over the "betrayal" by the INLD.

With this decisive victory in his bag, greater responsibility awaits Chautala. If success is entirely his, failure too would be his. This time he would have none around to blame for his shortcomings, if any. He will have to prove by his conduct that the image of a "humble Chautala" he presented during the past six months was not a robe worn for a stage performance to be discarded once the show was over, but had been consciously cultivated as a permanent feature.

The gravest charge levelled by Chautala against the Bansi Lal government used to be that the latter was allowing the blatant loot of the state’s resources. The INLD supremo would now have to ensure that while he keeps himself busy in politics, his cronies do not indulge in the same malpractice that he accused the Bansi Lal government of.

The INLD leader will have to prove that his full-length feature film is as attractive as the trailer he showed to the public before the elections.