From bondage to freedom
Freedom is
a process and a struggle, and the original, existential
choice of man invariably comes in conflict with the
commandments and prohibitions on which society is
founded. All social institutions, previously born of
freedom, subsequently turn into "burdensome legal
bonds", contends Y.P. Dhawan
A free action alone gives man the
assurance of selfhood, while an unfree action turns him
into an object. The crux of freedom is to choose, because
in true decision man no longer decides about things, but
himself; he and his choice cannot be separated, because
he becomes his (free) choice.
The question of choice is central to human
dignity and at the root of it is the phenomenon of
freedom which no man, whether he is a philosopher or
shoemaker, can escape. In the very impossibility of
escaping from the human situation "lies my will to
be myself, because I can have no other will. Here alone
lies the truth of the I am that makes it
impossible to be myself once again, as it were, to be
myself in some other way, or in many ways". (Karl
Jaspers). What I search is myself in the confusing din of
rival ideologies and different paths to wisdom. But there
is a limitation on my search. "Time is
pressing".
How shall I look for
myself? By understanding that no man can act if he waits
long enough to visualise all premises and possibilities.
Man is a contingent, not an omniscent being, and he has
to find his freedom in time, not eternity. He has to act
on such knowledge as he has, which can never be perfect.
An action completed on the basis of full information or
perfected insight is not a true action. It gives man the
benefit of omniscience or total understanding, while his
essence as a human being can only unfold in the human
situation.
The element of risk is
crucial in every human choice. In a true choice man
commits himself decisively to action and courageously
awaits consequences. He accepts his destiny. Malraux
risked his life two or three times, because any other
action would have given him a different conception of
himself. An action doesnt necessarily have to
exceed the margin of safety, but it has to be grounded in
original freedom which is choice.
To decide truly is to
assume responsibility for oneself; to regress to a
condition of endless vacillation is merely to acknowledge
that decision is difficult; it is also to act on the
assumption that I have "(an) other I behind what I
am as myself". There is no hidden I in
the I in which a man recognises himself as
himself that is all he is. Man can meet himself as
himself only if he is not afraid of looking upon himself
as his own freedom.
Failure and success are
not decisive categories in existential resolution
"the crux of the choice is that I choose".
Those who fail are not necessarily less gifted than those
who succeed. The true position where the selfbeing of man
is concerned is this. "For the ultimate criterion of
truth in resolution is not success, but what remains true
in failure". (Karl Jaspers).
Man can only know freedom
in the temporal process, not eternity. Whether it is
original sin or avidya, man can only become guilty if he
is free to incur guilt on himself. Starting with the
supreme Christian example (the point has been made
before) we are compelled to reflect that Adams
punishment was not in proportion to his crime. What did
he do after all? In a situation when choice became
essential he preferred Eve to God. In a comparable
situation any man of sensibility will do the same.
If he doesnt he
hasnt been seriously challenged and tried, and his
freedom has no meaning.
What use is mans
freedom if he cannot go against the commandments and
prohibitions? This point has been made by Thomas Mann in
his masterly way and this was exactly what Blake meant
when he said that all poets are of the devils
party. Indeed they are, because the true efflorescence of
imagination is achieved in protest and rebellion not
acquiescence and obedience.
Milton officially
concerned with justifying the ways of God to men (Paradise
lost) couldnt help taking that inner,
self-creating step which puts man in opposition to
reality. Man, it must be remembered, is a great
transformer of reality, because his will essentially
comes in conflict with what-ever is given.
One is not saying that man
is not bound by normative principles, nor is one
suggesting that there is lawless anarchy in his being
all. What one is saying is that freedom "is
an antithetical process". "With-out an
antithesis freedom becomes empty". In a completed
and perfected process like moksha or nirvana
freedom escapes from the human sphere and becomes
transcendent. Eventually man gets tired of the agonising
contradictions in his thought and experience, and chooses
the safe shelter of Platonic forms or Buddhist nirvana
or Hindu moksha. Perhaps rightly so.
But then the question of
freedom undergoes a metamorphosis and even pales into
insignificance. Freedom can only be known by man in the
human state, because it manifests itself as choice in the
temporal process. Whenever it becomes more, it becomes
truth or salvation.
Freedom is a process and a
struggle and the original, existential choice of man
invariably comes in conflict with commandments and
prohibitions on which society is founded. All social
institutions, previously born of freedom, subsequently
turn into "burdensome legal bonds". "To
create new forms of validity, it (freedom) must prevail
over the ossified demands". (Karl Jaspers.)
Conflicts with
institutions arise because ways of seeing and registering
experience change. New forms of sensibility arise and
patterns of human relationships change. Also "a new
born freedom sees itself faced with a necessity,
previously born of freedom". Freud, as a master
physician of our times, tried all his life to make men
free free against cant, hypocrisy, prejudice, shame
and fear. But mans fear of man is so great that he
prefers to become ill than give up his lurid ghosts which
are no better and no worse than anyone elses.
In the present day
authoritarian, bourgeois culture freedom can only exist
as insight, as rebellion or sado-masochistic fantasy. The
touchstone of freedom is not insight, but action. Harbert
Marcuse is substantially right in asserting that
"happiness, as the fulfilment of all potentialities
of the individual, presupposes freedom ... at root. It is
freedom". As this freedom (chiefly sexual freedom)
is absent in bourgeois culture, repressed instinctual
life in most people exists as frustration, unhappiness or
gratuitous, motiveless aggression. "The intensifying
rift between the inner and the outer world is
characteristic of bourgeois culture", says Alasdair
MacIntrye, and goes on to tell us that whatever
doesnt find place in external social life exists as
a feeling of "lack" or insufficiency in the
consciousness of the victimised individual.
If Freud is right in
maintaining that pleasure cannot be renounced cheerfully,
that it erupts as neurosis or mal-adjustment in the
individual whose defences are undermined, then the
question of individual freedom and social repression
becomes a life-and-death issue and the future of mankind
may depend on its effective solution. Freedom, as choice,
can only take care of the inner life of man; it cannot
cure his impotence in respect of his external
environment.
The war of freedom, where
human institutions are concerned, is essentially between
father and sons. It is a war no one can wholly afford to
win or lose. Constraints and taboos spring from the human
mind itself; repression also has its roots in the deeper
layers of the human personality. It cannot be got rid of
once and for all, because like a cancerous cell it will
always jeopardise the health of the human organism.
Philosophically speaking, freedom will always remain a
transformation of mans inner life. It will always
have to be discovered as existential resolution, as the
spark of self-being in man himself.
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