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This fortnightly feature was
published on September 13, 1998
The betrayal of
the soldier
By K.S. Bajwa
IN the 50 years of Independence,
Indian soldiers have served the nation with loyalty and
diligence. Even when poorly provided for, the soldier was
not found wanting in valour. Thousands amongst them have
sacrificed their lives and many more have cheerfully
borne, injury and hardship.
When we take a critical
look, we find that the political leadership often threw
away what the soldier had achieved. Invariably, the
political, economic and diplomatic follow-up has been
lacking in vision and national purpose. It seems that the
sacrifice of the soldiers has been, many a time, in vain.
The feeling that the soldiers have been betrayed has
become an uncomfortable reality.
Armed power was employed
to solve the problems of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Goa with
surgical precision. It is in tackling Jammu and Kashmir,
both in the initial approach and subsequently, that our
political leadership bungled. Soon after Independence it
became quite apparent that though the Maharaja was
enamoured of an independent Kashmir, it could not exist
as such for long. Even after it became evident that
Pakistan wanted to gain control of the state by any
means, our leaders continued wearing moral blinkers.
A clear-cut grasp of the
situation, under the then prevailing confusion and
uncertainty, was not easy. Nevertheless, long-term
national interests require incisive and hard decisions.
For our long-term strategic interests, the accession of
the state to India was not only desirable but also a
distinct possibility. We should have, therefore, done
some advance planning. Only in the afternoon of October
26, 1947, 1 Sikh was given a warning to be ready to be
flown at short notice to Srinagar. The airlift started at
8 a.m on October 27. We could have saved our armed forces
a measure of the crisis response that became necessary.
While the armed forces saved a greater part of J&K,
the political blunder of a reference to the UN, the
enforcement of a ceasefire when we had the military
initiative and the acceptance of a plebiscite, committed
the nation to a trauma which has defied a solution. The
national interests were only safeguarded partly and some
of the losses and suffering of our soldiers seem to be in
vain.
In the 50s, our dominant
political leadership failed to fully grasp that global
interaction was actuated by considerations of national
interests. All other factors, including moral
righteousness, even when subscribed to, was largely a
window dressing. Take the case of our northern border
with Tibet. It was not firmly defined on the ground.
Moreover, the Chinese had laid claims to large tracts of
traditional Indian territory.
When China actively
canvassed our support for her claim over Tibet, our
leadership miserably failed to extract a settlement of
the northern border as a quid pro quo. The
decision of not yielding an inch of Indian territory,
robbed us of flexibility to be able to carry out a
trade-off between Chinese requirement of an approach to
Tibet through Aksaichin, and our interest in protecting
our eastern states by settling the northern border. Our
national interests were poorly formulated and even more
inaptly pursued. The nation grieved and rallied behind
the soldier but did nothing to enforce the accountability
of the political leadership that had failed the people
and soldiers.
In sharp contrast is the
oblivion to which the British Prime Minister, Neville
Chamberlain, was consigned after his appeasement of Nazis
at Munich, which whetted their appetites and led to the
rape of Europe. But then we find it hard to dethrone our
national icons.
The year 1965 was
interregnum in the development of military power as a
vital instrument of state policy. Though militarily we
had achieved an upper hand despite our as yet incomplete
reorganisation, the untimely death of Lal Bahadur Shastri
robbed us of a firm follow-up that was in the national
interest. In the war against Pakistan in 1971, Indian
armed power had found its rightful place in the
formulation and conduct of state policy.
The strategic design of an
offensive in the east and an offensive-defensive in the
west, was well-conceived. The armed forces decisively
achieved the assigned national objectives. Bangladesh was
born and conditions created for the return of over 10
million refugees and the two-pronged threat from Pakistan
restricted only to the West. In the West, a truncated
Pakistan was effectively contained. Despite holding all
the trump cards, including over 93000 Prisoners of War,
our political leadership did not extract any enforceable
forward movement in the settlement in J&K. Today we
have only the Simla Agreement to parrot about. The
soldier was betrayed again.
The worst betrayal was yet
to come. In 1982, under the stewardship of Indira Gandhi,
the LTTE was provided sanctuary, material support, arms
and training facilities in India. This exercise continued
under Rajiv Gandhi. In cajoling and brow-beating both
Jayawardene and Prabhakaran to accept the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord in 1987, Rajiv Gandhi might have believed that the
IPKF would protect the Tamils and extend Indian
influence. In the beginning the Jafna Tamils too felt the
same. Jayawardenes cabinet, led by Premadasa, was
strongly opposed to the accord. Premadasa, apprehensive
that the IPKF might remain in Sri Lanka indefinitely,
opened direct negotiations with the LTTE. It is evident
that Rajiv Gandhi and his government failed to forsee and
handle this development.
The armed confrontation
between the IPKF and the LTTE, a force which both Indira
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi had helped to equip and train,
became an unpleasant reality. The worst betrayal of the
Indian soldier and the nation now occurred. While the
LTTE was killing our soldiers, the central intelligence
agencies continued to provide support to the LTTE to do
so. It is on record that the LTTE cadres continued to
operate from Tamil Nadu. Their wounded were being treated
in same hospitals in Chennai as were the Indian soldiers.
A more glaring irony is difficult to find.
There have been strident
demands for apologies for wrongs committed against the
nation. Why has no Indian demanded a similar accounting
and apology, for the purposeless killing of so many
soldiers in Sri Lanka? Do we regard our soldiers as mere
cannon-fodder to be wasted at the whim of a Prime
Minister? What national purpose was served by the IPKF in
Sri Lanka? Would the Indian government explain this to
the dependents of those who did not come back or those
maimed for life? Sundarji, the then Chief of Army Staff,
too must explain to the people and their soldiers, for
being acquiescent to this senseless massacre of our
soldiers. Are we, who wore and those who continue to wear
the uniforms of our soldiers with great pride and
devotion, going to be betrayed time and again? We must
get some answers.
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