This fortnightly
feature was published on August 16
Psyche marred by insecurity
By Kuldip Singh
Bajwa
PAKISTAN'S economy is virtually on
the brink of a collapse. To bail it out, the USA has
decided not to block the sanction of a loan from the IMF.
India too has expressed it's willingness to support this
move. An IMF team is likely to visit Pakistan to
negotiate a fresh loan package. Once it is sanctioned,
Pakistan would be saved from the disastrous fallout of a
default to service it's debts. The certainty and
seriousness of these economic consequences were amply
evident before Islamabad followed India with it's own
nuclear tests. Commenting on the conduct of these tests,
the out going US ambassador, Simon, in an interview to
Pak daily Dawn says, "your Prime
Minister(Nawaz Sharif) was undecided until the last
minute because he was well aware of the sticks."
Despite the writing on the
wall, Islamabad chose to go ahead with the tests in
pursuit of a well established penchant to get even with
India. It is quite apparent that Pakistan's long-term
national interests would have been better served if it
had not let it's nuclear capability out of the cupboard.
In any case, Pakistan had been loudly proclaiming its
possession of nuclear weapons since 1989. This was duly
confirmed by calculated leaks by the CIA and some other
US agencies. India could not have ignored this capability
and consequently, Pakistan had already achieved a fairly
reasonable degree of nuclear deterrence without openly
showing it's hand. What then were the motivations that
drove Islamabad to virtually commit economic harakiri?
Notwithstanding the grave economic crisis facing the
country, it's leaders, more especially the country's
Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub, keep on making tall claims
about their nuclear-missile capabilities and hold out
threats of dire consequences for India.
Kashmir is still trotted
out to be the core theme of any engagement with India. It
could not escape Islamabad that legally and morally Jammu
and Kashmir remains a part of India. Besides the country,
India's secular credentials, are vital for the well-being
of it's composite population with a Muslim component. The
population is larger than the Muslim population of
Pakistan. There is no room for any territorial maneuver.
Pakistan makes the
acquisition of Kashmir by any means the focus of its
foreign policy. Moreover, the formulation of its foreign
policy and the alignments that flow from it, have
invariably sought such patrons as would enable it to get
military parity with India. The aim would be to get the
better of it's far bigger neighbour. It may be argued
that the sense of insecurity inherent in this very
unequal geostrategic equation drives Pakistan to seek
this military parity. The history of the last 50 years
belies any aggressive designs which can be attributed to
India. Whether it was the invasion of Kashmir in 1947 or
in 1965, the armed infiltration into the Kashmir valley
followed by the attacks in the Chhamb and Amritsar
sectors or on December 3, 71, the attack in Chhamb
accompanied by air attacks on a number of Indian
airfields, it was Pakistan that committed aggression
against India.
In the world today there
are so many small and non nuclear states that are
peacefully coexisting with their larger nuclear
neighbours.
What is the rationale
behind the actively aggressive Pak hostility towards
India? We must look deeply into the national psyche of
Pakistan to discover the key to this mind-set.
Pakistan has anchored the
concept of it's national identity as well as estimation
of it's power, in the historical memory of invaders and
conquerors, who held sway over the sub-continent for
nearly a thousand years before the advent of the British
Raj. These Persian, Afghan, Mughal and Central Asian
adventurers, though professing Islamic faith, came to
India not to fight Islamic holy wars, but either to
plunder wealth or to carve out their own kingdoms. Some
invaders such as Nadir Shah and Abdali, made no
distinction between the faithful and the rest. They raped
and plundered them all.
In the early 1920s handful
of Muslim leaders, to promote their own vested interests,
conjured up the myth of Islam as a national identity to
demand a separate homeland for the Muslim minority of the
Indian sub-continent. It was a corruption of history that
led to the belies that a homogenous Islamic state would
be superior to the rest of India. This helped gather
strength for Pakistan, the Promised Land of the pure.
After the Partition of the
country, the new nation, invested itself with an aura of
superiority anchored in the historic memory of the
soldiers of the Islamic faith who invariably got the
better of the non-Muslim indigenous forces.
Unfortunately, this myth was soon shattered in Kashmir,
followed by 1965 when the Indian forces got the better of
Pak forces equipped with much vaunted US supplied
armaments and finally by the decisive Indian victory in
December 1971, which led to vivisection of bradari
of our village societies. In our villages a shark (one
who shares a common heritage including property) will go
to any length to get the better of a contending shriek.
Much of our rural violence and litigation flows out
of this mind-set.
In such situations, it has
been often seen that interaction on a level of equality
often breaks down the barriers. However, Pakistan has
invariably resisted any such approach. Pakistan fears
that in the absence of a strong and an enduring national
identity, free and close interaction of people may lead
to the break-up of the country and it's assimilation into
India.
In the interview quoted
above, Simon goes on to say that Pakistan suffers from a
sense of vulnerability. The sum total nearly amounts to a
hysterical national insecurity driven psychological
complex to always be one up on India. This illusion has
been deliberately cultivated and sustained ever since
partition. It has found deep roots in the national psyche
of Pakistan.
The awareness of the
people on both sides that this unhealthy rivalry and
hostility does not serve their interests will alone
change the mind set of over 50 years.
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