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news analysis
No hallmarks of ‘special ops’— Indian or foreign
Kanwar Sandhu
Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, January 14
While reports based on archival documents suggest that India sought help of the UK's Special Air Service (SAS), the actual conduct of Operation Bluestar in June 1984 had none of the hallmarks of a surgical stealth operation that special forces the world over are famous for.

Two letters dated February 6 and 23, 1984, written by Principal Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary and by the Principal Private Secretary to the then PM, Margaret Thatcher, have surfaced. They indicate that the UK collaborated with the Indian Government in planning military action in the Golden Temple. Reports suggest that at least three more letters, exchanged between the Indian and UK Governments and between UK officials, have not been declassified. Back home, except for the White Paper released by the Indian Government after the operation, no documents on the issue have been made public. Unless the complete set of documents on the issue are declassified, the questions raised by the documents will remain unanswered.

While the documents do prove that the military action was in the offing for some weeks, if not months, contrary to what the government and the military commanders made us believe, the moot question is: at what level, if at all, was the interaction of the British SAS with Indian officials?

The assaulting troops under Major General KS Brar (later Lt Gen), GOC of 9 Infantry Division, did include powerful detachments of 1 Para Commandos and Special Frontier Force (SFF), both Special Forces. However, both were used in frontal attacks, along with troops of other infantry battalions. While SFF was tasked to take the Akal Takht from the militants led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Para Commandos were to ensure this by wresting control of the structures around the Akal Takht, including the Darshani Deodi just in front of it.

There is no confirmation of SAS interaction having taken place at the operational military level. Lt Gen Brar has categorically refuted that UK's SAS had any role in the planning and conduct of the Operation, which was planned at the senior commanders’ level. In any case, he came into the picture only in end-May, 1984. Even officers of 1 Para and SFF deny any knowledge. Col Mahendra Pratap Choudhary, then Commanding Officer of SFF Group which was a part of the assault, said they had no contact with any foreign special forces outfit, including SAS. "The only foreign connection to our conduct were the specially designed Kevlar-plated bullet-proof helmets from Israel which were got on the eve of the Operation," he told The Tribune over the telephone.

Col Choudhary discounted suggestions that the gas canisters used by the SFF during the final phase of the Operation may have been provided by SAS, which uses "stun grenades". "We had been using these things even earlier," he added.

An officer of 1 Para Commandos said. "The CS gas canister cartridges were so indigenous that they had a marking "Made in Takenpur" with an expiry date of 1977!"

In fact, various reports had suggested that contingency plans had been made for an assault by the SFF in the weeks prior to the Operation on a model of the Golden Temple at its headquarters in Chakrata in Uttarakhand. Lt Gen Brar, too, makes a mention of this in his book, stating that this had been told to him by the commander of a sub-group of SFF during the operation. However, Col Choudhary denied that any such plan was made. SFF, which is also known as Establishment 22, is a para-military special force of India which was raised in 1962 for covert operations behind the Chinese lines in the event of a war. "Being a part of the Cabinet Secretariat, we were keeping a watch on the situation in Punjab and no more," he added.

Lt Gen PC Katoch (retd), who as a Major led a detachment of 1 Para Commandos into the Temple where he was wounded, also expressed surprise over reports of SAS advice to Indian Government. "The Special Group boys of SFF came to Amritsar at the last minute. Had they done reconnaissance on ground with or without SAS accompanying them, they would have not only been better prepared but also shared the information with us. Why would the Government of India contact SAS and not rely on its own Special Operations capability is beyond me," he said.

However, the documents which have now been declassified in UK do reinforce earlier reports that some senior officers of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which works under the Cabinet Secretariat, were in touch with the British counter-terrorism experts in the weeks prior to the operation and were regularly visiting UK. One such report had appeared in a prominent British newspaper on June 10, 1984. In fact, one of the two Indian intelligence officers named later became the Governor of a state.

Incidentally, three key figures, the then Army chief Gen AS Vaidya, Army Commander Gen K Sundarji and then Chief of Staff, Western Command, Lt Gen RS Dyal, are all now dead. Retired intelligence officers then posted in Punjab feel that what may have prompted the government to seek help of the UK counter-terrorism agencies was the fact that the political and law and order situation in Punjab was slipping from bad to worse from January 1984 onwards. "It looked like a cloak-and-dagger policy - to prepare for an assault and yet continue negotiations. The negotiations with Akali leaders in jail continued till one week before the operation," one of them said.

A senior intelligence officer said with the situation in Punjab deteriorating, they would often discuss the spectre of a bloody operation in the Golden Temple on the lines of the one in the Grand Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia in 1979. Over 400 people had lost their lives and about 1,000 had been injured when Saudi National Security Guards and the Army had secured the Mecca mosque from armed occupiers.

He recalled that starting with December 31, 1983, a number of disturbing developments were noticeable. On New Year eve, Bhindranwale, while addressing the customary congregation at the Golden Temple, had talked of rejecting peaceful struggle. In the following week of January, there were indications of a confrontation building up between armed supporters of the two Sants - Harchand Singh Longowal, the dictator of the Akali Morcha and Bhindranwale, head of the Dam Dami Taksal. On January 27, 1984, the Akali Dal leaders sought amendment in Article 25 of the Constitution in order to press for separate identity of Sikhs and threatened to tear the "article". The Akali Dal also announced a "Panth Azad" agitation from April 2, if their demands were not met. While sporadic incidents of violence were reported almost daily from Punjab, on January 28, two railways stations were also burnt down in separate incidents in Sangrur and Mansa areas.

Irrespective of whether the advice tendered was accepted or not, at this juncture the very fact that the UK Government may have colluded in the military action is sure to raise hackles of a lot of Sikhs, especially those living abroad.