M A I N   N E W S

Special to The Tribune
Egypt has uncanny parallel with Pak
Shyam Bhatia in London

fragile democracies The brutal military crackdown in Cairo, including the declaration of a state of emergency and curfew in major Egyptian cities, all invoke comparisons with what happened some 36 years ago in Islamabad and other Pakistani cities In July 1977, it was Pakistan's democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who posed a threat to the survival of the head of the country's military establishment, Gen Zia Ul Haq, was deposed in a coup Egypt's deposed president Mohammed Morsi was also democratically elected, just like Bhutto, and like Bhutto he too was deposed by his army chief Estimates of those killed after Gen Zia ul Haq toppled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 vary from between 5,000 and 20,000

Those searching for an international parallel with the political and military crisis engulfing Egypt need to look no further than across our border.

The deadly Egyptian violence that saw more than 600 killed and some 3,500 others wounded in Cairo on Wednesday alone reflects the kind of madness that also consumes Pakistan whenever the army takes over.

Estimates of those killed after Gen Zia ul Haq toppled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 vary from between 5,000 and 20,000. They were the victims of the Pakistan army’s ruthless crackdown against mass non-violent protests that erupted after Bhutto’s overthrow and later following his execution.

The brutal military crackdown in Cairo, including the declaration of a state of emergency and a dusk to dawn curfew in major Egyptian cities, all invoke comparisons with what happened some 36 years ago in Islamabad and other Pakistani cities. But even more than the sad loss of innocent civilian lives, what is so striking about the parallels is the similarity of motivations that prompted the army in both countries to act.

Back in July 1977, it was Pakistan’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who posed a threat to the survival of the head of the country’s military establishment, Gen Zia Ul Haq.

In fact shortly before he was deposed, Bhutto is said to have warned Zia that he would “fix’ him, a threat that Zia was not prepared to leave unanswered. The coup that followed and Bhutto’s subsequent hanging were the knock on effects of the challenge posed to the army by the civilian and democratic government.

Egypt’s deposed president Mohammed Morsi was also democratically elected, just like Bhutto, and like Bhutto he too was deposed by his army chief. Unlike Bhutto, Morsi did not have time for a direct face-to-face stand off with his army rival Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

Nevertheless, as far as al-Sisi was concerned, Morsi earlier this year had come to represent a mortal danger to both himself personally and to the institution of the army that has ruled Egypt since 1952.

Ahmadinejad’s visit changed it all

The key event for al-Sisi and the army was last February’s visit to Egypt by Iran’s former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Relations between Egypt and Iran had been frozen since the Iranian revolution in 1979 saw the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was later given asylum by Egypt where he died in 1980.

Before Ahmadinejad’s arrival, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi described Egypt as a “very important country” and “one of the heavy weights in the Middle East.” Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei had separately pushed the idea that recent Arab uprisings, including Egypt’s political changes, had been inspired by the Iranian revolution.

What Ahmadinejad and Morsi discussed in their private bilateral talks has not been formally disclosed, but their talks were monitored; al- Sisi had every reason to be concerned that the two men tackled the controversial issue of how Iran’s ayatollahs consolidated their power after the fall of the Shah.

Egyptian sources claim that Ahmadinejad explained in some detail how Iran’s revolutionary Islamic elite set up a parallel army in the shape of the Revolutionary Guard that ultimately outflanked the professional army set up for and by the Shah. His explanation would have delighted some members of the Muslim Brotherhood who independently called for an Egyptian version of the Revolutionary Guard to support the office of the President and be at the command of the state.

When al-Sisi had Morsi arrested on July 3, he almost certainly had Ahmadinejad’s visit at the back of his mind and what future awaited the Egyptian army under his command if Egypt’s Islamic President was allowed to stay in office.

“I will pave the ground for developing cooperation between Iran and Egypt”, Ahmadinejad commented before leaving Cairo. “If Tehran and Cairo see more eye-to-eye on regional and international issues, much will change.”

Such comments and the nature of Ahmadinejad’s discussions are among the key reasons why the Egyptian army decided to unseat Morsi’s elected civilian government. This was far more important than any immediate personality differences between Morsi and al-Sisi, or the sinister conspiratorial theories that see hidden hand of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies behind the coup in Cairo.

To be contined