States remain vulnerable
N.N. VOHRA
Governor of jammu and kashmir, former defence secretary, home secretary, principal secretary to the pm and chaired the national task force on internal security in 2000.

• India has 15,000 Kms long international border, 7,500 Kms of coastline, 600 island territories and 25 lakh Square Kms of Exclusive Economic Zone to be protected.
• The proxy war in J & K, Jehadi terrorism, Left Wing Extremism, insurgencies in the Northeast, emergence of Indian Mujahideen, revival of Sikh militancy, cross border infiltration and counter terror groups pose serious Internal Security threats.
• States have been unable to deal with internal disturbances and communal conflagration, forcing the Centre to deploy Central Police Forces, or even the Army, to restore normalcy.
• The Union, however, does so only at the specific request of the States and cannot deploy central forces on its own.
• Sources of security threats are no longer confined to the neighbourhood but have extended to the Middle East, South East Asia and beyond.
• States, by and large, have failed to maintain civil and armed police forces of high professional standard and in adequate strength.
• Only 4.3 per cent of the total expenditure of all States and Union Territories in 2009-10 were allocated to the Police and 80 per cent of which was spent on paying salary and pension.
• Four lakh sanctioned posts in State Police Forces were lying vacant at the end of 2009.
• States are also guilty of politicising the entire constabulary, eroding discipline, integrity and morale of the State Police Forces.
• As many as 22 States had not enacted a new Police Act till January, 2011.
• 19 States were yet to set up Police Complaints Authorities
• 24 States had not yet established State Security Commissions
• Most of the States were yet to segregate 'law & oder' and investigation.
• Most of the States yet to set up separate Intelligence & Anti-Terrorist wings.

Idea whose time has come
SANKAR SEN
former director, national police academy, hyderabad and director general, nhrc

• In the United States, the NCTC is a body set up by a legislation but has no power to arrest, detain, search or to interrogate.
• Unlike the US, where NCTC is an independent body, here the NCTC is sought to be made a part of the Intelligence Bureau.
• In the UK too, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre ( JTAC) has no executive powers.
• Vesting a covert organization like the IB with powers to detain, arrest, search and seizure even without informing the States is a dubious decision.
• Such a move could lead to litigation and allegations of human rights violation, which in turn could affect the functioning of both IB and the NCTC.
• The Home Minister must engage directly with the CMs in order to build a consensus.

Inadequate consultations
B. RAMAN
former additional secretary, raw

• Till 1993 State Police Forces largely dealt with terrorism. Punjab Police successfully dealt with terrorism; Police in Tamil Nadu dealt with Al Umma and the LTTE while Mumbai Police successfully investigated the serial blasts in 1993.
• The NDA Government did set up a CTC but named it MAC ( Multi Agency Centre) within the IB but without executive powers.
• 26/11 exposed the poor state of our preventive architecture.
• But there have been inadequate consultations before issuing the executive order. There is growing opposition, not just from the States but also from other Intelligence agencies.
• Chidambaram erred by confronting the States with a fait accompli and by not consulting them.

Three mistakes
PRAKASH SINGH
former director general of the border security force, dgp up and dgp assam

• Chidambaram deserves full credit for trying to raise a Counter-Terrorism architecture because the battle against terror has been fought so far on an ad-hoc basis.
• But the Home Minister made three mistakes. First, States were not consulted. Secondly, NCTC was sought to be made a part of the IB and, finally, it was wrong to vest powers of arrest etc in a secret agency.
• States complaining of infringement of federal principles, conveniently forget their own responsibility under the Constitution when they demand central assistance to deal with caste conflicts, communal violence, bandhs and even security arrangements for festivals.

Trust deficit
MADHUBHUSHI SRIDHAR
professor and head, centre for media law and policy, nalsar, hyderabad

• There are too many agencies and too many layers today to deal with Internal Security. Another body will not necessarily help.
• Terror attacks take place not because there is a deficit of 'power' but because of deficits in political will, capacities, capabilities and coordination.
• States fear the Centre and suspect power would be misused by the ruling party at the Centre in view of the misuse in the past of extraordinary powers the Centre has under Article 356 of the Constitution.

No panacea for all ills
R.K. RAGHAVAN
former director, cbi

• Agencies like the FBI, CIA and the Pentagon in the US had information on terrorists but they either did not share the information or did not realise the significance of the information they had before the terror attack on 9/11 in New York.
• Even after the US set up the NCTC, they failed to prevent an attack on a recruitment camp in Fort Hood ( November, 2009) or detect the abortive attempt by a Nigerian to place explosive devices in a plane ( December, 2009).
• NCTC, therefore, is not a panacea for all current ills. After all, the Multi Agency Centre ( MAC) too failed to prevent terror attacks.
• Posting of IB officials at Immigration desks at ports had not worked in the past. Empowering them now with powers to arrest, search and seizure may also lead to complications.
• Both the Centre and the States are guilty of unprofessional conduct, politicising the security apparatus and misusing the Indian Police Service (IPS) cadre.

Misplaced misgivings
SHYAMAL DATTA
former director, intelligence bureau and governor of nagaland and manipur

• Counter-terror doctrine is to provide a mix of defensive, offensive, overt and covert measures to go after the source of threats and impose deterrent costs.
• The current controversy provides an opportunity to remind the States of the poor state of civil policing and prompt them to initiate a massive overhaul.
• The IB so far has functioned jointly with State Police Forces in conducting inquiries, mounting surveillance and carrying out follow-up action.
• Contrary to apprehensions voiced, legal authority and powers to arrest, search and seizure will give IB both autonomy and flexibility besides making it exercise greater care, caution, circumspection and discretion.
• With the NCTC Council having representatives from States, it will impart greater awareness, understanding and accountability.
• NCTC will function under the Home Ministry and hence be accountable to Parliament. The IB is unlikely to be averse to even Parliamentary oversight.

Ham-handed
VED MARWAH
former governor of jharkhand and manipur and also a former special secretary, internal security, union ministry of home affairs and director general, national security guard

• In no other country in the world are issues of such importance as national security subjected to partisan politics.
• The States have neither the resources nor the expertise to deal with terror.
• Ham-handed implementation of a good idea has led to the present impasse and raised suspicion of a hidden agenda.
• It will be foolish for the Centre to take only a legalistic view and claim that powers of arrest, search, seizure etc. are already vested in the Centre by the existing Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
• NCTC cannot be a substitute for other agencies or the State Police.

Both Centre and States guilty
K.P.S. GILL
former dgp, punjab police

• The chief ministers do not seem to object to the idea of an National Counter Terrorism Centre or to increased role of the Union Government in countering terrorism.
• The core of a national intelligence network may lie with the Centre, but the substance will have to come from the States.
• However, both the Centre and the States have failed to make full or effective use of MAC and most of the States have failed to set up State Wide Area Network (SWAN) and State Data Centres (SDC).
• The political and administrative culture at the Centre is not all that different from the States and both can be blamed for shared incompetence and incapacity.