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China has prioritised development of infrastructure on all frontiers, including Tibet, with the belief that such infrastructure is part of political
and military power projection
China: Military Modernisation and Strategy AS China races forward in the next few decades to match its comprehensive national power with that of the US, the study of China’s military modernisation and strategy has become a mandatory subject for strategic analysts and military experts all over the world. Monika Chansoria’s book covers this subject comprehensively and lucidly. Starting with the evolution of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the book discusses its modernisation campaign, military doctrine and strategy (continuity with change), ever-increasing defence budget and modernisation thrusts and capabilities. The chapter "Trendlines in Infrastructure Development in Tibet" followed by India-related comments in the "Conclusion" make the study extremely useful for Indian scholars and policymakers.
China’s military modernisation and defence strategy has been evolutionary. It enabled the PLA to move from a revolutionary guerrilla force with the "people’s war" doctrine to a regular military force for national defence with revolution in military affairs (RMA) equipped capabilities. The PLA became more powerful and the principal guarantor of China’s internal and external security after the Cultural Revolution and abolition of the radicalised Red Guards. Deng Xiaoping was major civilian proponent of military modernization, but the real eye-opener was the Vietnam War. Instead of teaching a lesson to the Vietnamese, the Chinese ended up learning one themselves. The PLA realised its poor mobility, weak logistics and outdated weaponry, inadequate communication and an unclear chain of command. Deng promoted military modernisation and distanced the military from politics. He stressed on the combination of a small but highly trained army with large, strong reserves. The changes led to reconfiguration of ground forces, consolidation of military regions and the beginning of combined arms and joint services exercises. The 1990s saw the PLA concentrating solely on issues of army building with political commissars losing their prominence. Thousands of military rules and regulations were codified and implemented. Professionalism in the senior ranks was mandated for going up the career ladder. The PLA was also disengaged from the first line internal security duties. In the wake of the Gulf War, the PLA’s strategy was revised to focus on "limited wars under high technology" and later, under "modern informationalised" conditions. The military budget kept increasing by about 15 per cent annually. China has made national security, military and nuclear strategies and "New Generation Operations Regulations" public. The military strategy emphasises "active defence", which includes pre-emptive or counter offensive. The strategic and doctrinal approach follows thinking of Sun Tzu, Lao Zi and Zuang Zi. The nuclear strategy is outlined in the "Five Musts", stated by Jiang Zemin in July 2000, the most important one being "China must pay attention to the global situation of strategic balance and when there are changes in the situation, adjust its nuclear weapon development strategy in a timely manner". In the current decade, doctrinal emphasis is on Information Warfare (IW). There is a shift from Joint Operations to Integrated Joint Operations (IJO). China’s military believes that IW presents a level playing field for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary. The IJO reflects that Service divisions do not matter when command chains are flat due to the levelling power of digital command, control and sensor systems; something that India’s armed forces refuse to learn due to turf interests. Cyber warfare is a well-appreciated tool. A US government report on "Capability of the PRC to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation", released in October 2009, warns that China is ramping up its digital attacks on business and computer networks. The shift in the PLA’s posture from regional defence to trans-regional mobility is perceptible. It is gradually making its units small, modular and multi-functional in organisation through appropriate downsizing and structural reforms. China has prioritised development of infrastructure on all frontiers, including Tibet, with the belief that such infrastructure is part of the political and military power projection. It can be used to defend territory or to recapture "lost territories" like Southern Tibet (PRC name for Arunachal Pradesh). In the coming years, a robust military modernisation will present Beijing with an array of options for military coercion and to press for a politico-diplomatic advantage to resolve pending territorial disputes in its favour. China may even force a military solution where it has a military strategic advantage. Given that China has impending settlement on its border disputes with India, Japan and four Southeast Asian countries, its comprehensive national power shall prove to be a key pivot. Chansoria’s diligent
research is reflected in hundreds of notes after every chapter. It has
brought in some duplications and chaff. That notwithstanding, the book
is very informative.
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According
to Chansoria, the centrality of military power in achieving and
maintaining state security expounded by Sun Tzu over 2,000 years ago is
the key which makes China develop its economic and military power in
step and view the diplomacy and war in comprehensive and dialectic ways.
An editorial in the Chinese People’s Daily newspaper in 2004
had stated: "The strong unity between the military and the civilian
government and the strong unity between the military and civilian people
have played an extremely important role in years of revolution and
construction in China, particularly over recent years."