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Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle THE object of this comprehensive study is to elucidate and explain how, where and why Napoleon, a military genius, was defeated in Russia. His grand army was the best in Europe in 1812 which was destroyed and Alexander I, the Tsar of Russia, pursued Napoleon all the way from Moscow to Paris, driving him to his abdication and the restoration of the French monarchy. Author Dominic Lieven is a professor of history at the London School of Economics, and is easily one of the ablest scholars of Imperial Russia. Lieven has a personal connection to the story because one of his ancestors was a close friend of the Tsar’s mother.
Lieven has the courage to challenge several myths current about Napoleon’s defeat in Russia. He finds that Leo Tolstoy’s extremely popular interpretation of the Russian resistance to the French as described artistically in War and Peace is misleading. Tolstoy argued that it was not the individuals in authority but chance, rains, snow, vastness of land and the elemental patriotic fervour that inspired the Russian people, which was to ruin Napoleon’s army. The author plays down the role of the army and services in the Russian resistance. However, Napoleon thought in retrospect that it was the long supply line and the terrible loss of his horses that compelled his retreat from Russia. Lieven explains that it was not the Russian patriotic spirit nor the coldness of the weather but the superior military, administrative and diplomatic leadership that forced Napoleon’s retreat. According to him, the Tsar and his top leaders out-thought Napoleon, and Napoleon went down by Russia’s defensive plans and strategic retreat. The core of the book is a study of ground strategy, military operations diplomacy in other words polity. Lieven emphasises that "the horses were crucial, perhaps even the most decisive factor in Russia’s defeat of Napoleon"! The author points out that it was Napoleon’s great blunder to stay in Moscow for more than a month. In Moscow, Napoleon set up his headquarters in the Kremlin. The Russians set fire to many parts of Moscow. The city was reduced to a state of "dreary wilderness" where the water was impure and air polluted. During the summer and winter of 1812, 270 million roubles worth of property was destroyed—an astronomical figure at that time. Some sections of the civilian population were embittered that Alexander’s policy of "retreat" and not fighting Napoleon directly manifested purely a defeatist mentality, but such a feeling petered out shortly. The sight of Moscow on fire hardened Alexander’s determination to achieve victory. In the Russian two-year campaign, Napoleon lost 1,75,000 horses which broke the back of his army. Lieven points out that two facts were largely responsible for the retreat of French troops: firstly, the outstanding performance of the Russian light cavalry; and secondly, the fighting spirit of the Cossocks who attacked the French troops in the rear. Lieven concludes that more than anybody, it was Alexander’s leadership that cast the dice in favour of his victory. In the light of this work, one can conclude legitimately that Napoleon met his Waterloo in Russia. This remarkable work of
impeccable scholarship and deep insight is a solid achievement. This
meticulous study is meant for specialists and experts who are
interested in the study of advanced military and diplomatic history.
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For long, Napoleon’s
defeat in Russia has been explained from the French, German, British
and Austrian angles, but this work redresses a historigraphical
balance by giving the Russian version. The author has used for the
first time the Russian military archives and the Slavic records in
Helsinki. This work is not only a detailed account of battles lost or
won but also of the society, culture and governments of Europe.