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Significant Battles
Since Independence
The books gives out the political and military setting prevailing at the start of a battle or war and then describes the operations before the author arrives at his conclusions. Some of the battles, the author opines, hold significant lessons for the Army, but for some strange reason, they have not been given due importance in the learning process. Irrespective of technological advances in weapons and equipment, some principles of functioning of any army remain constant, although the actual modality of their application may change its nuance. Thus, the lessons of wars and battles fought in the past are still valid. Battle affects the entire course of war and in turn, the nation’s history. Analyses of battles reveal fault lines in professional thinking and training and also indicate the philosophy and intellect of an army. In 15 chapters, the author, an infantry officer who commanded 301 Mountain Brigade before, during and after the 1971 Bangladesh campaign, discusses all wars since Independence. He has chosen a few battles, including saving Srinagar and the siege of Poonch in 1947-49, the battle of Se La in 1962, the Fazilka battle in 1971, for detailed analysis which he believes holds significant lessons for commanders as they provide an insight into the thinking, planning and execution in the Army. He also lays stress upon the selection of commanders at higher levels and points out that outstanding junior or mid-level commanders don’t necessarily make effective top-rung leaders. One such example quoted in the book is that of a Lieutenant General who was highly successful in war as a battalion as well as a brigade commander, but proved to be a disaster as an army commander in another war. The author rightly states that the reputation of an army is gauged from its last war. In the Indian context, if the past two wars/battles are seen, the picture is not so good. The 1987-89 Sri Lankan misadventure saw the Army leaving the island with none of its aims achieved. Huge gaps in training and operational planning came to light and the Army suffered heavily in terms of casualties and loss of self-confidence. The next in line was the Kargil conflict in 1999, where the role of senior leadership came into sharp focus. Failure of intelligence, lack of equipment and dilly-dallying over decisions came to the fore, though the saving grace was the courage of officers and men at the sub-unit level. The role of the Air Force in short wars is also discussed and in view of past experiences, the author feels that a change of priorities is required. He also lists out some indications, along with supportive arguments, of what needs the nation’s attention. The foremost among them is the need for appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff, though his contention that the post should always be held by an Army officer is bound to generate some debate. Inculcation of moral courage and self-respect in commanders at all levels, the author stresses, is the biggest lesson to be learnt by the Army from its past experiences. Involvement of the Army in matters best handled by the police and para-military, training of commanders and the performance of JCOs and NCOs, pay, cross-attachment and training of officers with other arms and sister services, remuneration, post-retirement rehabilitation and lateral induction in other organisations are among other such indications. The foreword has been written by Lt Gen S. K. Sinha (retd), Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. The book also carries a number of operational maps and sketches.
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