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The Shaping of Modern
Gujarat: Plurality, Hindutva and Beyond
The narrative it weaves is refracted through the prism of the authors’ personal experience of public life in Gujarat during the past two decades, including the recent pogrom in the once-peaceful state. In recent times, Gujarat seems to be on a path that was never charted throughout its history, the authors argue. It has become exceedingly intolerant. Caste differences are far more rigid, altruism is on the wane, exploitation of the helpless is increasing, labour is made to work for less than subsistence wages, the environment is exploited to the hilt without any heed to consequences and above all, no one seems to mind indulging in meaningless violence, especially against the Muslims, in the name of religion. Much of this intolerance, the authors say, is the result of the rising Hindu fundamentalism, in which the rich, poor, upper caste, lower caste, tribesmen, intellectuals, English educated, vernacular educated, all seem to participate unquestioningly. This was not how it was in the past. There were strong tendencies of non-violence and adjustment in the society of Gujarat. The mercantile ethos of this region fostered a climate of peaceful co-existence. As a result, by the 10th century, Gujarat had a flourishing Muslim merchant community as also a body of Persians, the Parsis, who had fled their homeland because of persecution by the Muslims. Collective methods of conflict resolution and decision taking were evolved so that the civil society could successfully abjure the use of force. A system of collective decision taking through bodies like the Mahajans and Panchayats had been in place for many centuries before the Government of India introduced the panchayati-raj system. Non-violent mechanisms of coercion were evolved. A hartal, prolonged enough, could bring even the most obdurate of governments and governors to listen to reason. It simply meant putting a tala (lock) on the hatt (market). Recalcitrant individuals could be forced to fall in line through an effective social boycott. To be sure, there were episodes of considerable violence, too. Often, outsiders perpetrated these. Muslim raiders, Arabs from across the seas, Afghans, Baluch and Tajiks from across the western desert and the Marathas from across the southern forests came frequently to despoil the rich merchant communities of Gujarat. The marauding Marathas, say the authors, put to sword everyone on whom they could lay their hands. Even Brahmins were not spared. The repeated looting of Surat destroyed this once flourishing entrepôt. It was the Muslims, though, who came to personify the enemy even though there were significant examples of Muslim communities like the Bohras, Memons and Khojas being primarily interested in trade rather than violence. The next phase of economic growth came with the colonial rule. Along with the industrial growth, arrived a huge working class and rampant urbanisation. After independence, industries grew even faster. Unfortunately, the growth was considerably unregulated. The Gujarati love for lucre and the ability to create money out of the flimsiest opportunity was so intense that there was little hesitation in resorting to the industrial production of poisons. With the government centralising all regulatory authority in its own hands, the various mechanisms of social regulation became ineffective. A democratic polity further exacerbated the problem and encouraged the people to form caste and religion-based alliances for controlling state power. The final stage of such development seems to be the unquestioning spread of a Hindutva-based polity with support from all social groups and classes. The support continues, say
the authors, despite the communal pogroms that such a polity encourages.
This, to say the least, is depressing, but the authors see no
alternative. Except for the Muslims, who are being targeted and forced
into ghettoes, everyone seems to be enjoying the fruits of unregulated
economic growth. |
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