Revolt of the cannon fodder
M. Rajivlochan

The Garrison State: the Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab 1849–1947
by Tan Tai Yong. Sage, New Delhi.
Pages 333. Rs 640.

"FOR God’s sake, don’t come, don’t come, don’t come to this war in Europe. Write and tell me if you and your regiment are coming or not. I am in a state of great anxiety, and tell my brother… for God’s sake not to enlist. If you have any relatives, my advice is do not let them enlist."

This was the tenor of the letters that Punjabi soldiers wrote from the field of battle in Europe during the First World War. Yet over 3.5 lakh new recruits were persuaded to join the army and go to fight a war in Europe being conducted by an incompetent set of Generals who knew little about modern warfare and were eager to press their soldiers to the front to die in the barrage of machinegun fire.

How was it that so many young men from the Punjab got persuaded? What was the incentive offered by the British? What happened to Punjab as it became the sword arm of the British Empire? These are some of the questions that have been answered in this extensively researched book.

What happened was that the Punjab was converted into a garrison state. A special relationship was created between the civil and the military administration. The civilians began to use their understanding of local society and local contacts among the elite of Punjabi society to encourage the youth to join the army in order to become cannon fodder for the imperial war being fought in Europe.

The big landlords who aimed at becoming influential politicians were encouraged to give relief in lagaan to their peasants, if their sons joined the army. The various pirs and babas who dotted the rural landscape of Punjab were hired to convince the young men that it was part of their destiny to fight for the English. In return, the babas and the zamindars were given knighthoods and jagirs.

Quotas were fixed for villages, which created a market for purchasing recruits. Villages which did not want their young men to join the army pooled in money to buy recruits from the less prosperous villages.

Demobilisation after the war was to be managed by Soliders’ Boards in the districts. The district boards and the village soldiers’ committees under them also tried to counter the influence of the khilafatist and non-cooperation nationalists on the demobilised soldiers

It was part of such strategies that the government gave in rather easily to the demand for gurdwara reform. Special concessions were offered to the Sikh soldiers to ensure continued loyalty to the colonial regime. Yet, with the growing demand for a separate Muslim state, there was considerable uneasiness among the Sikhs over the fate of their land and religion in the political turmoil of India.

The Kirti Kisan communists were influencing the Sikh soldiers, urging them to take on a more active anti-colonial stance. All this had the British government worried. In December, 1939, a Sikh unit in Egypt mutinied. In June, 1940, the Sikh Squadron of the Central Indian Horse refused to be transported overseas. As a result, in 1940, the Indian Army suspended the recruitment of the Sikhs.

The next year only half the usual numbers were recruited. Clearly, the British faith in the loyalty of the Sikhs was shaken. These were clear signs that the British rule over India could not last any longer.

The great martial-race con that the colonial government had begun in the 1850s was about to end with a bang that might have been larger than the one in 1857. The Punjabis had had enough of being a sword arm.

However, before the change could happen, the British decided that it was better to leave while a full-fledged rebellion of the Sikhs was still at bay. This has been beautifully documented in this interesting book on the history of Punjab.

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