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News Analysis
Kashmir — the ball is back in Musharraf’s court
by K. Subrahmanyam

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s gentle query to General Musharraf to spell out the options to resolve the Kashmir issue and the General’s low key reply “I will think and get back to you” mark a new chapter in Indo-Pak relations. In a sense it is an invitation to General Musharraf to think through the Kashmir issue and come out with realistic solutions. The General had earlier offered that both sides should focus on solutions which neither side rejects after running through all options.

India is of the view that conversion of the Line of Control into an international border is the rational solution. Pakistan does not accept this at this stage but has not come up with its alternative solution. Now Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has tossed the ball into the General’s court. Since India is the status quo party and Pakistan the revisionist one it is now upto Islamabad to propose new solutions.

Pakistanis have been clearly told by the UN Secretary General and the US that a plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir is not feasible. They also know that since they have altered the demography of their portion of the state of J&K irreversibly, plebiscite is totally out of question. Pakistan could keep silent over Kashmir when it suited its convenience as it did from 1972 to 1989. Kashmir dispute more than the interest in the Kashmiri people served Pakistan’s purpose of keeping alive the hostility towards India. That in turn justified Pakistan Army’s Central role in Pakistani politics. Since 1949 till early ‘90s Pakistan benefited out of overt and tacit support of US on Kashmir issue.

Following the Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests the Permanent members of the Security Council issued a statement in which, instigated by China, they demanded discussions on the Kashmir issue. This gave the Pakistanis the impression that they could internationalise the Kashmir dispute. Consequently they resorted to the Kargil intrusion. But faced with India’s stiff resistance US and China let down Pakistan. US, led personally by President Clinton, came out strongly in favour of India. It is possible that Pakistan’s support to Taliban and Al Qaida and Pakistan-North Korea missiles for Uranium enrichment exchange influenced US stand.

9/11 compelled US to treat Pakistan as a frontline state to obtain forward bases and intelligence access in Pakistan. The US poured in billions of dollars of aid into Pakistan. However, over a period of three years US found that Pakistan was playing an ambivalent role in regard to cooperation with US on elimination of terrorism. According to US assessment, while Pakistan offered some cooperation in the war against Al Qaida it was not forthcoming in cooperation in the war against Taliban. Pakistan knew that US would have very little stake in them once the war on terrorism was over. Therefore, the Pakistani strategy was to extend limited cooperation to US even while not allowing important leaders of Al Qaida and Taliban in Pakistan to be captured. Initially Musharraf was very permissive of activities of Jehadi organizations in Pakistan, including their cross border terrorism into Kashmir and Afghanistan. The Jehadis were dissatisfied even with Musharraf’s limited cooperation with US and started targeting him as well.

These developments appear to have led the US to lay down their terms to General Musharraf and make their demands explicit. The US is clear that General Musharraf should not create any difficulties in the election of Hamid Karzai as President in the Afghan elections. They want better results from Pakistan in terms of Al Qaida operating in the tribal territory on Pak-Afghan border. They insist on better control on Jehadi organizations within Pakistan.. It is now clearer to US and General Musharraf that more terrorism the Jehadis are able to perpetrate in Kashmir, within Afghanistan and against Musharraf in Pakistan ,the general morale of Al Qaida will be enhanced and they will claim greater victories. Therefore, Musharraf appears to have been advised not to be provocative vis-a-vis India and concentrate on more effective control on Jehadis. In return, the US will support Musharraf not shedding his uniform and may consider enhancing economic aid on the basis of Musharraf’s ability to deliver on the war on terrorism.

This US strategy was plain during the recent visit of Musharraf and Manmohan Singh to New York. The NSSP I was signed with India and further improvement in Indo-US relations was promised if Bush came back. In the case of Pakistan there was only repetition of past promises. There was a Bush-Karzai-Musharraf meeting to ensure that there would be no Pakistani interference in Afghan elections. Evidently Pakistan was given a message even earlier that the Indo-Pak composite dialogue should continue without any hitch. General Musharraf has been left in no doubt that future US aid to Pakistan depends entirely on Pakistani behaviour. While General Musharraf played according to the script in New York he did allow his frustration to become explicit when he talked of a 50-year ally who fought and won the war against the Soviet Union being let down in favour of a country which was not with US during the Cold War (that is India).

Though in public the US government issues certificates of good conduct to General Musharraf the US media, President Karzai, US Ambassador Khalilzad in Kabul, the Pakistani Army operations in the tribal territory and General Musharraf’s domestic position and his inability to appear in public all indicate the extremely delicate position in which the Pakistani Government and Army find themselves. That would explain General Musharraf’s geniality in his interaction with the Indian Prime Minister. If this situation is to be exploited further to India’s advantage Delhi must continue to improve its attempts to cultivate good relations with the US. In this respect, the image of improving relations is as important as the reality.