Egypt’s peace offensive towards Israel
Rakesh Dattta

Egypt in a Changing World
by A. K. Pasha. National Publishing House, New Delhi. Rs 500. Pages 339.

"Israel, on its own, was not that strong. It was the backing and support from the USA that made it strong and defiant," opined Anwar Sadat. At the same time, shifting global and regional power realities, Arab disunity, detente and growing Israeli clout, including lack of sophisticated weapons, compelled Egypt to pursue a bold and imaginative policy towards Israel.

Providing comprehensive account of the largest Arab state involvement in the Palestinian cause, the book also highlights the US attempt to use Arab-Israel conflict to perpetuate its influence among the key oil-producing states. A collection of published articles by A.K. Pasha, the author, says that the 1952 Egyptian revolution was a turning point in the history of the region, which alarmed the Israelis.

Later, the nationalisation of Suez Canal and Egypt’s decision to seek Soviet arms led to Israeli leader David Ben Gurion collaborating with France and Britain against Egypt. The formation of Pan-Arab Council and Nasser’s determined efforts to espouse the Palestinian cause gave it its full political dimension. Otherwise, it would have remained a mere refugee problem.

However, according to the author, tragedies of four Egypt wars with Israel and rising defence spending to 33 per cent of its national income with an alarming debt problem and the food riots of 1977, including the loss of revenue from Suez Canal, Sinai oil and tourism, had awakened Sadat to the urgency of resolving the conflict with Israel.

Even though by signing peace process with Israel and promoting Egyptian interest by demanding the return of lost territories, Sadat was accused of relegating the Palestine issue; yet he was the first Arab leader, who while addressing the US Congress, highlighted the Palestinian problem and even called for the formation of Palestine’s government in exile.

In the chapter Egypt’s Quest for Peace with Israel: the US Factor, the author has examined the US role in Suez war; Yemen crisis; negotiations on the UN-242 resolution and Nixon peace plan, whereby a strong Israel was favoured to fight its own battles. The chapter also includes Roger Plan; Camp David talks; Geneva Peace Conference and Sinai Agreements under the US mediation.

The author has also analysed the role of Zionist lobby, especially Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and the US unwillingness to confront Israel for seeking concessions for the Egyptian and Palestinian people, despite Sadat’s claim of Israeli dependence on the US from a loaf of bread to a Phantom aircraft.

The next chapter explores peace with Israel and the Soviet factor. The arms deal with the Soviet Union became a turning point in Egypt’s relations with Moscow. The author has analysed the genesis of doubts and disillusionment between the two countries. The Soviet hesitancy in supplying arms to Egypt for the fear of their passing into the US hands was strategically ruinous for Sadat failing to build a bargaining capacity vis-a-vis the Israelis. Those weapons were diverted to India.

Later, the Egyptian leadership was convinced that 99 per cent of the cards in the Arab-Israel game lay with the US and, therefore, the Soviet Union was expendable. The fifth chapter analyses the Egyptian rule in West Asia and North Africa.

According to the author, Nasser’s attempt to defend Palestine and Arab interests brought him in conflict with other Arab states and made him a victim of Pan-Arabism. While the Israeli invasion of Lebanon complicated Egypt’s re-entry into the Arab fold, the growing anti-Americanism and the Soviet indifferent attitude had put Egypt in a cold peace with Israel.

Making a comparative study of religion and politics in Egypt and Iran, the author has brought out the predominant role of the clergy, especially the Iranian Revolution, and the fear of such occurrences in Egypt. In the seventh chapter, the author has made an interesting linkage that how Egypt’s food insecurity brought warming up in the US-Egyptian relations, which became supportive to Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy.

Highlighting the diplomatic and peace efforts of Hosni Mubarak towards Israel despite domestic constraints, the author has cautioned both Israel and Palestine to show restraint to bring back peace process on the right track. It would also neutralise rising Islamic groups in Egypt prodded by the USA.

The last chapter brings out India’s cultural ties with Egypt from the ancient times, referring to the many similarities between the two countries. The role of Nehru and Nasser in conceiving NAM and setting up of Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo have been highlighted. The book also covers a detailed account of all cultural exchanges that have taken place between the two countries.

The author says that there is a need to open an Egyptian cultural centre in India and take useful initiatives to widen and deepen the relations between the two countries. The book carries a rich bibliography. The author has contributed significantly to the studies on Middle East and West Asia, including the publishing of this book, which will be of immense help to the scholars working in this area.

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