Saturday, February 15, 2003 |
|
A CLOSE look at our history shows that the record of our military failures has been phenomenal. That is largely due to the scant attention paid to the understanding of military defence preparations. We seldom have had a military manual written equal to what had been produced by Machiavelli, Bacon, Clausewitz or F.A. Lindemann. It is astounding that the Historical Division in the Defence Ministry which was promoting research in the study of military history, was wound up for reasons best known to the powers that be. The Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs also met a similar fate. Early last year Lieutenant-General Y.M. Bommi asked me whether I could read the manuscript of his book on Kargil warfare, particularly the portion relating to the history of the conflict between India and Pakistan. He wanted to ensure that the facts contained in his draft were accurate. Later he invited me for the release of his book, Kargil-1999: The Impregnable Conflict, by Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, former Chief of General Staff, at Gymkhana Club, New Delhi, on October 30 last. Manekshaw’s
presence at the occasion was an additional reason for my interest in
attending the book-release function. Like many others, I have been a
great admirer of Manekshaw due to his outstanding services rendered
during the Bangladesh war. Bold, upright and imbued with a passionate
patriotic fervour, he kept the current of politics out of the Army,
and set the highest military standards of professional conduct: I too
felt a little affinity with him because he belonged to my hometown,
Amritsar, where his family had lived for more than three decades. His
father, a physician, was highly respected, and the Suri Chemist shops
in Hall Bazar and Katra Ahluwalia, still flaunt their association with
him. Hindu College, where Manekshaw had studied, exults in claiming
him as its versatile and famous alumnus. |
The entire function was neat and elegant and over in fifty minutes. Lieut-General (retired) Y.P. Khurana introduced the author and his book. When Manekshaw rose to release the book, he received a tremendous ovation. A vote of thanks was moved by Lieut-General K. K. Singh. The most emotional part of the function was the presentation of copies of the book to some of the soldiers who had fought in the Kargil war. After the book release, the guests moved into the cottage for cocktails. After three years of research and site visits to the war theatre combined with interviews of Indian and Pakistani army men, Lieut-General Bommi, a research fellow of the United Services Institute, has produced a massive book of 658 pages with 24 chapters, including 40 photos showing the terrain of the region. Widely travelled, and having fought the Indo-Pak wars in 1965 and 1972, Bommi retired as Director-General of the Assam Rifles. The author addresses the following questions: was the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil an isolated incident, a manifestation of dichotomy in Indo-Pak relations? Why does Pakistan consider Kashmir as the ‘core issue’? What are the nuances of fighting in a rugged high altitude area? How did the intrusion unfold itself? Was India’s military machine ready to face the challenge? Bommi also holds the stick from the other end by asking how Pakistan could have fought to ensure their victory in Kargil. The author provides not only a recital of the principal events connected with the Kashmir dispute but also highlights their significance by drawing specific attention to the fatal lapses on the part of the Indian Government both at military and diplomatic levels. The book traces the genesis of the Indo-Pak differences and rivalries by focusing on the Kashmir issue which ignited the conflicts between India and Pakistan. According to the author, the strategic points generating contending issues and widening rifts were Kashmir’s accession to India, the Indo-Pak wars, the Simla Agreement, the nuclear tests, the Lahore entente, Kargil war and the Agra summit. As during the Sino-Indian war in 1962, we were also caught napping when Pakistani troops had taken possession of some key points in our territory, demonstrating again the failure of our intelligence system. While countering routine terrorism which had almost become an everyday affair, we had neglected vigilance in other areas where winter patrolling and maintenance of guard was absolutely necessary. The author laments that besides a colossal intelligence negligence, the government failed to resort to air-action, thereby losing time to destroy the enemy’s entrenched position. The author has rightly paid a glowing tribute to the heroic and gallant Indian troops who fought bravely against the heavy odds of a difficult terrain, inclement weather and lack of adequate military support due to the politicians’ delayed action. By their noble deeds and sacrifices, the troops saved the honour of the country in most desperate circumstances for which the country should remain ever grateful to them for all times to come. General Bommi’s painstaking research, comprehensive and lucid, undertaken with unstinted labour, gives a candid blow-by-blow account of the Kargil war. It is a valuable contribution to war literature. |