On this Tuesday, a 30,000- strong crowd had gathered at the Idgah in downtown Srinagar to observe the death anniversary of Mirwaiz Moulvi Farooq. As the afternoon prayers ended and the speakers came to the dais, a section of the audience grew restive. They began shouting slogans and alleging that they would not tolerate any ‘saude bazi’ by the leaders. The hate-mongers were at it again and the outcome was identical— the Valley’s moderate voice was silenced forever. All Party Hurriyat Conference leader Abdul Ghani Lone was shot dead by two gunmen as he was leaving the venue of the meeting.

The brazen attack was perfectly timed. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had just landed in Jammu on a three-day visit to the state. A week back, on May 14, a fidayeen squad, comprising three persons, had killed 23 men, women and children in Kaluchak. The nation had reacted unanimously and both Houses of Parliament had authorised the government to take appropriate action against such dastardly attacks by Pakistan-backed terrorists. Vajpayee’s visit to the bleeding border state was part of the initiative to assess the conditions first-hand before deciding on a decisive course of action. This plan had to be in concert with the fact that J and K Assembly elections are scheduled after just four months or so.

Apparently, the government had been encouraging various political groups since last year to give peace a chance and revert to the electoral process. The process had found some amount of favour with a section of the Hurriyat Conference and Abdul Ghani Lone had, time and again, articulated his stand on the issue. He and Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, son of the slain leader, had travelled to Dubai for a meeting with leaders from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir on April 16 and 17. According to reports, Lone had made it clear that the people of Kashmir had suffered tremendously because of the militancy and a peaceful resolution should be attempted.

The Track II diplomacy on Kashmir has an interesting angle. G.M. Shah, the estranged brother-in-law of Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, had mooted the idea of a people-to-people conference in Srinagar last year. According to his son, Muzaffar Shah, "the idea is to bring people of both parts of Kashmir together so that they can make recommendations on how to resolve the ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan." The idea had found takers in PoK but the Pakistan government vetoed issuing of visas to the delegates. Shah has again proposed such a conference.

Lone’s son is married to PoK separatist leader Amanullah Khan’s daughter. The leaders from respective sides of the border shared a special bond, much to the discomfiture of the ISI. However, the process of getting people from both the sides to talk to each other was reportedly encouraged by the USA too. As such, prominent Kashmiris settled in the UK and Canada had managed to create channels of communication between the two parts of Kashmir. The Dubai conference was part of the process of getting them together on a common platform. The ISI chief Ehsanul Haq had specially flown down to Dubai to dissuade Lone and the Mirwaiz from taking a soft line and participating in the electoral process. However, if reports are to be believed, Lone had stood firm and negated the ISI’s bid to keep the ante up in the Valley. Ironically, at home, Lone was often dubbed as an ISI agent and he had been manhandled by Shiv Sena activists recently for his alleged pro- ISI stance.

The twin approach of starting a cross-border dialogue of leaders along with ‘fair and free’ elections in Jammu and Kashmir had just about started to yield dividends when Lone was gunned down on May 12. It indicated Pakistan-sponsored militants’ designs to derail both Track II diplomacy and the electoral process.

In fact, despite September 11 and the much- hyped American war cry against terrorism, Pakistan’s strategy has remained unchanged. It has, over the years, carried out an intensive low cost war against India through infiltration and repeatedly dared India to carry out substantive operations across the Line of Control. Kargil was a classic example of ‘I-dare strategy’ flying in the face of the Lahore bus diplomacy. India reacted ‘with restraint’ and it took all of Bill Clinton’s cajoling to get the Pakistani troops out of the Kargil sector.

Post September 11 and the war against the Taliban have together given General Pervez Musharraf opportunities to dare India. He has a handle in the form of Al Qaidia activists, perhaps even Osama bin Laden, to keep the Americans on tenterhooks. After the attack on Parliament, when substantive action against Pakistan was on the cards with heavy troop deployment on the border, Musharraf used the Americans to make India back off. The USA needs Pakistan help in nabbing some of the most wanted men in the world who are believed to be hiding in remote tribal areas of this country. By daring India, Musharraf has provoked Indian mobilisation and used it to plead that though he wishes to help the US against the Taliban terrorists he cannot spare forces for a joint search against them in Pakistan. This way, he has tried to buy time for the likes of Osama bin Laden while keeping his own domestic pitch on Kashmir reasonably shrill. Willy-nilly, the Americans have so far carried on with him, counselling restrain to India even in the face of gravest of the provocations.

Obviously, Musharraf is riding a tiger and there is no dismounting it. The Kaluchak killings and Lone’s assassination have further hiked up stakes and brought the situation to a flashpoint. The UK Foreign Secretary assessed on May 21 that there is a real possibility of war between India and Pakistan. Vajpayee’s exhortations to troops at forward positions have soundly indicated that there cannot be any compromise on the issue of cross- border terrorism and the only defence is offence. The pro-active model had to be activated.

But does a war suit Gen. Pervez Musharraf? Hasn’t he carried his policy of daring India too far? The answer to these questions is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. For one, as a military strategist, Musharraf is inclined towards brinkmanship. He is a risk-taker who believes in exploits that bring short term one upmanship rather than long term gains. The Agra Summit is a prime example of the general practising his deception to win wah wahs at home. The other example is Kargil that put India on the backfoot, albeit for a short duration of time. The third is his attempt to hoodwink the Americans by promising one thing and delivering another. He promised President Bush all support in the war against terrorism and then provided safe sanctuary to the Taliban cadre. He has repeatedly talked of a dialogue with India and in the same breath promised full moral and diplomatic support to the terrorists operating in Kashmir. He promised cooperation and then backtracked when a list of 20 terrorists was handed over to him by India. For five months now, the two armies were on high alert along the international border and war was inevitable yet the Jammu temple killings happened, blasts took place in Srinagar, including the one in the secretariat building. Finally, Kaluchak and Lone killings brought the situation to a boil.

A war suits the General. For one, it will divert attention from the Al Qaida terrorists hiding in Pakistan. He doesn’t want them caught and will do anything to stave off this possibility. Second, he seems pretty sure that the war may bring him territorial gains. From the Indian point of view, this seems implausible. However, from Musharraf’s point of view, it is very much in the realm of reality given the volatile situation in J and K. He may be willing to willing to bet his shirt on it. Even in the worst-case scenario of minor gains for both sides, he can leverage support from the Islamic countries and even the Americans and the British to bring about a quick ceasefire. The Islamic countries have already warned India against launching an attack into Pakistan. The USA is worried about its troops which are present in the country.

Third, the nuclear option. India is a ‘responsible’ country that will think many times before going for this last option. This is not the case with Pakistan as perceived by a host of countries. Musharraf’s image of one having itchy fingers can be counted to stand him in good stead in time of need. In fact, he can use the ‘delinquent’ status to blackmail the world. So for all practical purposes, it is Musharraf, and not India, who can speak of a limited, surgical offensive. He would, therefore, like to try it out. Kashmir is his pet hobby horse for which he can lavish every resource at his command. After all, he would like to be remembered as the Pakistani President who avenged the creation of Bangladesh.

War doesn’t suit Pakistan whose economy is in a shambles. Musharraf could have cared for world opinion and India’s hurt over terrorism and averted confrontation. However, these have been the least of his concerns. He has consciously practised the politics of provocation and is apparently willing to shoulder the risks that go along with it.

PHOTOS BY REUTERS