Sunday, February 18, 2001		Article

"We cannot keep the old standards of fighting war"

COMMISSIONED into the Dogra Regiment in 1961, Lt-Gen Surjit Singh, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command is a battle experienced officer and an expert in counter-insurgency operations.

An alumnus of the National Defence Academy, the general officer, has over a span of 39 years, held wide ranging command, staff and instructional appointments.

He was Mentioned-in-dispatches for gallantry during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, and later awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal for services rendered in Punjab. During the 1971 War, he commanded his battalion on the western frontier. In 1998 he was decorated with the Param Vishisht Seva Medal.

A graduate of the College of Defence Management and the prestigious National Defence College, he has served as Chief Instructor at the Defence Services Staff College, besides a tenure with the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan. He has also commanded a corps in the Western Sector. He assumed charge of Western Army Command on September 30, 2000 after commanding the Central Command for about two years.

Soft spoken and amiable, General Singh is an avid nature lover and committed to eco-environment improvement. He spoke to Vijay Mohan in his office at Command Headquarters, Chandimandir.

Security has many facets. National security pertains to economy, industry, the political system and what we understand as the physical security of the country's frontiers.

Security dimensions have changed. Earlier people used to think that national security meant only the security at the frontiers. For example, the bomb blasts at Mumbai infringed on national security. If the economy is being undermined by fake currency coming into the country, it is a threat to national security. If communal tensions have increased as a result of external confluence, it is a facet of national security. If there is an undercutting of the trade due to trade practices not being followed correctly, it is also a challenge to national security.

At the apex level, we now have the National Security Council where all these facets are represented and people capable of handling this are incorporated.

The challenge to national security lies in the proxy war, which is not merely fighting insurgency in Kashmir but also the ISI network, which is fairly extensive. If they create communal tension somewhere, that is also proxy war. As far as proxy war in J&K is concerned, it is a well-known fact and Pakistan has been acknowledged as the perpetrator and has provided financial support for it. To that extent, our security concerns have involved diplomacy and political process, followed by peace initiatives.

Nuclear weapons are not something new, but the ambiguity about their existence has been removed. There was a perceptible threat by Pakistan during the Kargil conflict that it may use nukes, but it never did. This highlights the fact that in the present context nukes are likely to be used as a threat-in-being, but their use is neither advisable nor acceptable. No sane or responsible government will resort to the use of nukes. They are basically for deterrence. There has been no direct impact on the way of fighting a conventional war, but to cater to any eventuality we do study doctrines and passive protective measures.

Every war is peculiar. Kargil was a war of its own kind, fought at the highest altitude. It brought out certain lessons that in case we have to fight at that level, then how to manage it in terms of equipment and tactics. In the conventional field it has given us some tactical lessons, but positively, in the overall strategy of war fighting it has not had any significant impact. At the tactical level one may have learnt lessons, but at the strategic level it has brought out nothing revolutionary.

I presume, Pakistan would have learnt its lessons and would not like to repeat it, but the possibility of any irrational act cannot be ruled out. In the present environment where peace initiatives are going on and the prevailing world opinion, it would not be prudent for it to do so. But should it do so, national security determines that you cater for such an eventuality and take measures accordingly.

For fighting a successful war, jointmanship is a prerequisite. Jointmanship does not mean only the Army, Navy and the Air Force, but also involves the intelligence and the foreign policy, which are now being synergised at the national level. Between the services there had always been an endeavour on jointmanship in planning and procurement. These are revolutionary things and there is always a scope of improvement. Every time we have a discussion, we find new areas where we can go in for jointmanship. In fact, our functioning is also integrated. We have IAF officers posted to command headquarters Further improving upon jointmanship is high on our agenda in areas of planning, sharing information, procurements and execution of operations.

At the apex level we have the National Defence College where there is total integration. As far as the conceptualisation is concerned, it exists already. We have a system of Chiefs of Staff Committee and its sub-committees, that itself is a form of joint conceptualisation. At the moment -- some restructuring is going on. The Chief of Defence Services (CDS) model is being talked about. If that comes into being this aspect will further be taken care of.

All nations have a doctrine on how they would deal with a particular situation in respect to national interests. We have also evolved one and it is under refinement. Whatever else is happening -- proxy war, Kargil -- are all facets of a bigger war. Pakistan cannot fight a bigger war that is why it is indulging in proxy war -- a low cost option. This does not make the war-fighting doctrines irrelevant. They have facets, should a regular war come how to fight it, should a irregular war come, how to fight it.

The exercise was a part of their routine winter collective training. Sometimes, they carry ammunition, but the point is that once the formations have moved out and are carrying ammunition, it takes very little time to convert into a war posture. For this reason, the other side has to remain cautious. we were on the lookout, but Pakistan declared that it is pulling out its formations. The situation is well under control and there are no immediate threat perceptions.

Technology and information warfare is a major thrust area because of the speed with which the complete processing takes place in the modern day war. The exploitation of technology is very high. We have drawn an IT road map and there is a special budget for it. It could take a few years but progressively, the entire Indian Army would be linked on a network. A certain amount of linkage is already there, which would be expanded down to unit level. IT training starts right for the academy and goes up the hierarchy, even in the higher command courses.

Information Warfare was best seen during the Kargil conflict. It has many facets and was also used successfully in the Gulf War. It is now being taken into account. Various training capsules are being organised -- first to generate awareness and then devise means and methods to exploit it. This is very essential. We have to keep pace with the rest of the world.

Individual training is extremely essential as it is the backbone of war fighting. If the individual is not well trained, everything above it is meaningless. In fact its importance has increased with the proxy war and diverse areas of commitment. Two-thirds of training time is devoted to individual training with only one-third time on formation level training. Individual training has also assumed significance because of new weaponry and equipment being inducted and the soldier needs to keep abreast of new developments as well as be proficient.

Standards have also gone up for jawans. With intake getting highly competitive, more graduates,including technically qualified, are getting enrolled. Since jawans have to handle highly sophisticated equipment, we cannot keep the old standards of war fighting. Given the emerging warfare complexities, we may have to incorporate facets of SSB type selection for officers as well as for jawans.

War is an all arms effort and as seen in Kargil, the infantry and the artillery were together in action. As far as the infantry is concerned, we have to ensure that the foot-soldiers' equipment is made lighter, giving him the capability of speed, surprise and catering for the lethality which is coming in. Training methods have been revolutionised and sophisticated simulators have been introduced for imparting weapon training.

This is again a revolutionary process because of the changes in technology. Basically, it is the weapon system which is being affected because the war is increasingly being fought at night and how the weapon system can be used. Therefore new weapon systems are being incorporated. Accordingly, manpower is a very important criterion. we cannot increase it and have to remain within certain limits. Certain changes have occurred and we are trying them out on the ground.