M A I N   N E W S

Eight EKM subs ‘below standard’
From Girja Shankar Kaura
Tribune News Service

NEW DELHI, Feb 8 — Military purchases have always been shrouded in obsessive secrecy. The details of the contract signed by officials or the reasons for which the equipment is bought only from a particular firm never come to light.

There is hope now that with the Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, ordering a probe by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) into all defence deals since 1985 will probably bring out the facts. However, this will depend on how far the investigations go.

While only the deals for the purchase of Bofors guns and HDW submarines raised controversy, some of the other questionable defence deals have gone almost unnoticed. Incidentally, the equipment mentioned above proved their ability despite the controversy. However, the equipment bought in some other deals has actually proved to be substandard.

After the MiG-29s purchase another deal which has raised doubts was that of the purchase of eight Russian-built EKM submarines at a cost of over Rs 800 crore. The deal for the purchase of these eight seriously impaired submarines, again from Russia, was signed between 1986-90.

While nothing came out about the payoffs, if any, that might have been made. Yet the purchase of the submarines has had most serious implications for the national security.

Sources disclose that the diesel-electric powered submarines have debilitating limitations. These defects make the submarines vulnerable during war.

A former Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) had, in a confidential note said that the deficiencies in the submarines were “dangerous”. Notes of naval commanders, ever since the submarines arrived in 1991, outline the extent of deficiency.

The 3000-tonne submarine’s major handicap is its higher indiscretion rate. An indiscretion rate of a submarine is a critical element of its offensive capability. It denotes a sub’s capacity to remain at a snorting level. The higher the rate, the lower is the submarine’s ability to remain at a level required for an offensive. The standard indiscretion rate of other submarines is about 6 per cent to 8 per cent while patrolling and 12 per cent to 15 per cent in the transition phase. An internal navy report had said that the indiscretion rate of EKM submarines was way above the standard rate.

Reports also said that the ‘Sindhus’ as the EKMs have been rechristened is grossly underpowered. Its 2 x 120 batteries are inadequate to give it a surging power in critical times. In comparison, other submarines of the same class have double the number of batteries with lesser tonnage.

Another problem of ‘Sindhus’ is its sonar; especially its low frequency band coverage and frequent breakdowns. While the low frequency band coverage makes it difficult for a sub commander to accurately classify an enemy target, one of the EKM subs, INS Sindhuvir, has already been offloaded to a Russian ship repairing yard for extensive refit at a staggering cost of Rs 74 crore. The submarine had cost India around Rs 100 crore initially.

While the senior naval officers even at the time of the purchase had pointed to the deficiencies, the question mark still remains over the deal. There are no answers available as to why India went in for submarines with questionable combat ability?

Another report prepared internally by the Navy said that the naval officers involved in the selection and purchase of the subs, did not have a clear assessment of the capability of the EKMs. One reason pointed for the wrong assessment was the “sketchy” information provided by the Russians. They did not either part with the design data or the indiscretion rate.

Interestingly the report also pointed out that the officers were taken in by the “looks”. They were so impressed with the looks that many of them thought the EKM resembled a nuclear submarine design. However what was not realised that it was highly underpowered even for a conventional boat.

Strangely, the naval brass till the end of 1988 considered the Russian submarines to be superior to the SSK subs built by the HDW. A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report later said the opinion of the Navy was not based on actual assessment of the combat capability of the submarines.