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While the
Portuguese did not offer any determined resistance in
Goa, their garrisons in Daman and Diu put up a stiff
fight before surrendering, writes Anil Shorey
The
forgotten battles of Daman and Diu
WHILE
a lot is known about the classical liberation of Goa,
little is known about the heroic battle of Daman and Diu,
where maximum fighting took place, causing quite a few
casualties to Indian soldiers and a lot more to the
Portuguese troops. Twentyseven years ago Operation
Vijay was the code name given to the Indian
Armys plan to liberate Goa, Daman and Diu from
nearly 450 years of Portuguese rule. Even after 14 years
of Indias Independence, the Portuguese stubbornly
continued to occupy these territories in spite of the
local populations struggle against occupation and
suppression. Indian troops moved in on December 18, 1961,
under the overall command of Lt-Gen J.N. Chaudhuri,
GOC-in-C, Southern Command. Goa was captured with
relative ease following a three-pronged drive by 17
Infantry Division under the command of Major-Gen K.P.
Kandeth. However, the enclaves of Daman and Diu were
captured under stiff resistance by 1 Maratha Light
Infantry (1 Maratha) and 20 Rajput (Jodhpur),
respectively.
Daman, just about 72
square km in area, was a small Portuguese enclave located
at the southern end of Gujarat bordering Maharashtra and
just about 193 km and four hours drive north of Bombay.
The countryside is broken, interspersed with marsh, salt
pans, nallahs, paddy fields, coconut and palm
groves. The river Daman Ganga splits the capital city of
Daman into two halves Nani (north) and Moti
(South). An airfield was (and still is) located in Nani
Daman. The Portuguese garrison in Daman was headed by a
Governor, Major Antonio Bose da Costa Pinto, with 360
armed Portuguese troops, 200 policemen and about 30
customs officials under him. The strategically important
features were Daman Fort, the Air Control Tower (ACT) of
the airfield and, of course, the Daman Ganga separating
Daman City.
The key components of the
plan of 1 Maratha under its Commanding Officer, Lt-Col
SJS Bhonsle, were the swift occupation of the Daman
airfield, the need for speed to avoid unnecessary
casualties to own troops and a force self contained for
10 days. The plan was to capture Daman piecemeal in four
phases, to start with the area of the airfield, then
progressively to area garden, Nani Daman and finally Moti
Daman to include the fort. During the wee hours on
December 18 the start line was crossed. However, the
surprise was lost when A Company (Coy) tried
to capture the Air Control Tower (ACT) and the battalion
suffered its first three casualties. The enemy lost one
soldier while six were taken captive. D Coy
captured Point 365, just before first light. At the crack
of dawn two sorties of Mystier fighters attacked enemy
mortar positions and the guns inside the Moti Daman Fort.
The momentum of the advance by the Marathas was carefully
maintained and monitored. By noon the airfield was
negotiated by A and C Coys simultaneously. In the ensuing
exchange of fire A Coy lost one more man
while seven were wounded.
However, the Portuguese
had had enough as the Marathas kept on advancing
aggressively. The next morning the Secretary to the
Governor of Daman with some civilians displaying a white
flag came forward to surrender unconditionally. Later,
the Governor, who was wounded, came forward himself to
meet the CO and soon the garrison commander Major Antonio
Jose da Costa ordered his forces to cease fire as he
signed the document of unconditional surrender. In this
operation the unit lost four men, including a JCO, while
14 were wounded, earning one VSM for the CO, two Sena
Medals and five Mentioned in Dispatches, while the
enemys casualties were more than double.
Approximately 600 Portuguese were taken captive
(including 24 officers) and a large quantity of arms,
ammunition and vehicles were captured.
At the Diu theatre, Lt Col
Bhupinder Singh, CO of 20 Rajput (Jodhpur) was told to
capture Diu, a small island just 39 square km in size
located at the southern coast of the Saurashtra
peninsula. The unit concentrated at Una near Diu by
December 17, 1961. Patrols were sent to the village of
Kob and beyond to observe the pattern of the tides, phase
of the moon and the likely crossing places on the creek,
after which it was decided to cross the creek from the
northern side of the island. The operation was planned in
two phases. In phase one the Diu airfield was to be
captured to block the advance of the Portuguese and to
stop any reinforcements from coming in. In phase two the
entire island was to be captured. In consonance with the
plans the unit started its final preparation.
Again, during the wee
hours of December 18, 1961, A and
C Coys launched their boats and phase one of
the operation commenced. As the companies reached the
middle of the creek the Portuguese on Diu opened fire
with two MMGs and two LMGs, capsizing some of the Rajput
boats. Major Mal Singh along with five men pressed on his
advance and crossed the creek. On reaching the far bank
he and his men assaulted the LMG trenches at Fort-De-Cova
and silenced them. The Portuguese MMG fire from another
position wounded the officer and two of his men. However,
with the brave efforts of company Havildar Major Mohan
Singh and two other men, the three wounded were evacuated
to shore and safety. As dawn approached the enemy
increased the intensity of fire and the battalions
water crossing equipment suffered extensive damage. As a
result the CO had to order the battalion to fall back to
Kob village by first light.
Soon after dawn, the
Indian Air Force was requisitioned and they bombed the
island of Diu. Sitting on the home bank the troops could
see the enemy ammunition, petroleum dumps and water
reservoirs being destroyed by the bombers. Fort-De-Cova,
Secho and Fort-De-Mar, which were the Portuguese strong
points, were heavily damaged. The Indian naval ship
Delhi, which was positioned on the eastern edge of Diu
island, also joined in and took on targets at Fort-De-Mar
and the citadel.
Later that evening
B company, which had now relieved
C company of 4 Madras at Gogis, destroyed
other enemy positions with rockets and six pounder guns.
The Portuguese finally gave up their resistance and
indicated their willingness to surrender. Their
emissaries were brought to the battalion headquarters for
formal talks and on December 19 by noon the Portuguese
formally laid down their arms. In this swift action the
battalion took 403 Portuguese as prisoners, which
included the Lieut-Governor of the island along with 18
officers and 43 sergeants. For their gallant action Major
Mal Singh and Sepoy Hakam Singh were awarded Ashok Chakra
(Class III).
While the Portuguese did
not offer any determined resistance in Goa, their
garrisons in Daman and Diu put up a stiff fight before
surrendering. A likely explanation of this is that the
authorities in Goa lost touch with these enclaves and
thus they could not pass on to them the instructions to
cease resistance. All these three operations were classic
inter-services joint operations where speed, secrecy and
well co-ordinated actions of the Indian Army, Navy and
the IAF played handsome dividends, thus assuring total
success in all spheres.
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